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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

: Case No.

940762-CA

V,

:

KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD

: Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for unlawful dealing
with property by a fiduciary, a second degree felony, in
violat ion of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513 (Supp. 1993), in the Fifth
Judicial District Court -in and for Iron County, the Honorable
Lyle R. Anderson, Judge Pro Tern, presiding.1

This Court has

jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3 (2) (f) (Supp. 1994).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Does Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513 (1990), providing for

unlawful dealing with property by a fiduciary, require that the
fiduciary have complete control or possession of property before
felony sanctions.

The review court independently reviews

questions of statutory construction for correctness.

State v.

Galleaos, 849 P.2d 586, 589 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Souza, 846
1

Judge Anderson, of the Seventh Judicial District Court,
was evidently assigned to preside over this case by the Honorable
David L. Mower, following the disqualification of the original
trial court judge, the Honorable James L. Shumate (R. 228-29).

P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah App. 1993).
2.

Was defendant entitled to a special verdict on the

precise manner in which she violated her fiduciary duty, where
the precise manner of the violation is not an element of the
offense?

An appeal challenging the refusal to give jury

instructions presents a question of law.

The trial court's legal

conclusion is not accorded any particular deference and is
reviewed for its correctness.

State v. Singh, 819 P.2 356, 360

Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 832 P.2d 476 (Utah 1992).
3.

Did the trial court exercise appropriate discretion in

denying defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing on her
motion to disqualify the prosecutor and in denying the motion?
Review of the trial court's denial of an evidentiary hearing and
denial of a motion to disqualify is had for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Gines, 964 F.2d 972, 977 (10th Cir. 1992), cert,
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1023 (1993); United States v. Peterman, 841
F.2d 1474, 1484 (10th Cir. 1988), cert, denied, 488 U.S. 1004
(1989); State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217, 1227 (Utah App.), cert,
denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes and rules,
whose interpretation is determinative of the issues on appeal,
are cited below and reproduced in full in Addendum A.Utah Code Ann. 76-1-104 (1995);
Utah Code Ann. 76-1-106 (1995);
Utah Code Ann. 76-6-401 (1995);
2

Utah Code Ann. 76-6-513 (1990) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Kimberlee H. Winward, was charged by amended
information with unlawful dealing with property by a fiduciary, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513
(Supp. 1993) (R. 180-81).

The State's theory was that defendant,

a real estate agent representing George and Marie Bauers in the
sale of their home, violated her fiduciary duty by selling the
property to a stand-in purchaser ior $40,000, who immediately
conveyed the property to another for $58,000 on a trust deed
which the stand-in then assigned to a private financier for
$45,000, yielding defendant an additional commission of
$4,697.50, all at defendant's direction and without disclosure to
the Bauers (see probable cause statement, R. 3-5). Defendant was
convicted following a jury trial (R. 1089).

The trial court

sentenced defendant to a' term of from one to fifteen years in the
Utah State Prison; however, execution of the sentence was stayed,
pending defendant's compliance with the terms of her probation
(R. 341-44).

This Court later stayed all terms and conditions of

defendant's probation, following the granting of defendant's
application for a certificate of probable cause (R. 357-58).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 6, 1992, George and Marie Bauer listed their Cedar
City home with ERA Realty Center for $45,900 (R. 792-794; Ex,
21)•

Defendant was then a real estate agent with ERA Realty (R.

793) .
3

In the summer of 1993, eighteen-year-old Nicole Packer was
employed by defendant as a live-in assistant to do clerical work
and odd jobs in her real estate practice (R. 828-30, 995-96).
Sometime in July, defendant suggested to Nicole that she buy the
Bauers' property and then resell it at a higher price, splitting
the profits in equal thirds between them and defendant's husband,
attorney Kent Winward (R. 832-34, 1021).

Because she trusted the

Winwards, Nicole agreed to sign the necessary papers, although
she had neither the intention nor the funds to buy the Bauers'
home (R. 831, 835-39).
On July 12, 1993, Nicole signed an earnest money agreement,
contracting to buy the Bauers' property for $40,000.

The earnest

money agreement identified defendant as the selling agent (R.
835, 847, 851; Earnest Money Sales Agreement, Ex. 6). Nicole did
not know until August to whom she would sell the property, and
she did not know the selling price until the closing (R. 840-41,
850) .
Meanwhile, Kent Winward approached one of his clients,
Vickie Bassett, a beauty parlor employee, about purchasing the
Bauers' property, which both he and defendant showed to Vickie
(R. 875-77, 1005-07).

Defendant told Vickie that the property

could be purchased for $58,000, including a $3000 down payment.
Neither Vickie nor her husband Dan had any money to purchase the
house, but defendant and Kent Winward agreed to accept Bassett's
payment of the down payment in the form of haircutting, nail and
laundry services, with the balance of the purchase price to be
4

handled through private financing (R. 877-81).

On July 15,

Vickie and Dan Bassett signed an earnest money agreement,
contracting to buy the Bauer property from Nicole Packer for
$58,000.

This earnest money agreement identified defendant as

both the listing and selling agent "representing the seller" (R.
738, 889-90; Ex. 10).
Defendant located Patricia Williams to provided the
financing the Bassetts needed from the proceeds of a
contemporaneous sale of other property in Cedar City.2

On

August 4, Williams signed a letter of intent authorizing Southern
Utah Title Company to disburse $45,000 from the proceeds realized
from the sale of the other property to Nicole Packer upon
Nicole's assigning to Williams the $55,000 trust deed note
received from the Bassetts (Letter of Intent and Authorization
for Release of Funds, Ex. 23).
The closing of all the various transactions in this case
took place on August 6, 1993 at Cedar Land Title, Inc. (R. 733,
736, 754, 760). The Bauers, appearing alone, sold their home to
Nicole Packer for $40,000, less $2400 in commission and other
closing costs (R. 742, 752-53; Settlement Statement, Ex. 8). No
one informed the Bauers that their home was to be immediately
resold (R. 743). According to Tom Goodman, Defendant's principal
broker and the listing agent in this transaction, defendant would
2

Williams held a $70,000 note on property owned by the
Gracelys. Defendant arranged to have the Gracelys sell the
property to the Hayes (R. 854-55, 1006-07). The closing was
supposed to take place on July 17, but it was delayed until July
26 (R. 1006-07).
5

have received between $600 and $800 in commission on the BauerPacker transaction (R. 796).3
After the Bauers signed the closing papers and left, Nicole
Packer and Vickie Bassett came in to Cedar Land Title,
accompanied by Kent Winward, and completed their transaction:
Nicole deeded the property to Vickie, who, without the designated
$3,000 downpayment, purchased it for $58,000 at thirteen percent
interest (R. 754-56, 889-90); Vickie then gave Nicole a trust
deed in the amount of $55,000; and Nicole assigned the trust deed
to Williams for $45,000, which sum was received, under Williams's
instructions, from Southern Utah Title company (R. 757-60, 779,
783) .
Nicole testified that she signed documents whose meaning she
did not know at Kent Winward's direction (R. 861, 865-67).

She

also stated that she never signed the second earnest money
agreement, selling the house to the Bassetts, and thought that
Kent Winward had probably signed it (R. 848, 852). Defendant
never told Nicole how much profit was realized on the sale,
though she assumed that it was $3,000 because she received $1000
(R. 842-43).
After deducting closing costs on the series of transactions,
$4,697.50 was left over (R. 756). Cedar Land Title wrote a check
payable to Nicole Packer for this amount (R. 724, 730, 749, 779;
Ex. 1). Kent Winward picked up this check and, without telling

3

Defendant claimed she received only $300 in commission
from the sale of the Bauers' property (R. 1019-20).
6

Nicole, deposited it in defendant's bank account (R. 730, 846).
As to the Packer-Bassett transaction, ERA Realty did not
authorize it, and Goodman neither knew anything about it nor
received anything from it (R. 800-01, 803). Although the
documents indicated that ERA Realty was entitled to receive a
commission, none was disbursed on Kent Winward's instruction that
no realty agents were involved in that sale (R. 747, 780).
Sally Melling, the agent who handled the closings on August
6, stated that in the eight years she worked for Cedar Land Title
she had never participated in a closing in which a real estate
agent immediately turned over the same piece of property or in
which she possessed the original and all copies of the earnest
money agreements, all of which she found unusual (733-34, 78889) .
The listing agreement indicated that the Bauers wished to
sell their home on cash terms (R. 811, 819; Ex. 21). However,
the Bauers testified that while they were initially interested in
cash only, they were willing to consider other offers and
expected that all offers would be communicated to them (R. 91315, 929). George Bauer testified that if the right offer had
come in, other than cash, they would have accepted it, that there
was no agreement that only cash offers would be accepted and that
Goodman had told them that all offers had to be forwarded to them
(R. 930-31).
The State's real estate expert, Lori Ann Blackner, testified
that in order to become a licensed real estate agent one must
7

pass a course in which ethics and an agent's duties to his
principal are taught (R. 969-72).

Accordingly, a seller's agent

has a duty of full disclosure and loyalty and is thereby required
to inform the seller of anything that may affect the sale before
closing (R. 973-76).
Goodman stated that if either the Bassetts' $58,000 offer at
thirteen percent or Williams' offer of $45,000 to purchase a
discount mortgage had come in within a few days of Packer's
offer, he would have passed it on to the Bauers because he worked
for them and because it was his obligation.

Also, if he had

known that Nicole Packer had no money and was just standing in to
facilitate another transaction from Williams, he would also have
disclosed this to the Bauers (R. 823-24).
Defendant acknowledged that one of the key lessons learned
by real estate agents is that of loyalty and fiduciary duty and
that she must fully disclose everything to her client (R. 1015).
She knew all the details of the transactions (R. 1016).
it in mind all along to -make a profit (R. 1021).

She had

She never told

the Bauers that Nicole Packer was standing in to facilitate the
transaction (R. 1036).
Defendant never informed the Bauers of Packer's immediate
reselling of their property to Bassett for $58,000 at thirteen
percent interest (R. 911, 918-19, 933, 935, 958, 1017), although
the Bauers would liked to have considered the Bassett offer in
spite of Vickie Bassett's impecuniosity because of the high
interest rate (R. 940-54).

Defendant never informed the Bauers
8

of Williams' $45,000 purchase of the Packer-Bassett $55,000 trust
deed note (R. 912, 935), although defendant acknowledged that she
could have informed the Bauers about Williams' offer before they
closed the deal (R. 1041).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
Defendant's argument, that facts proved at trial do not make
out offense of unlawful dealing with property by a fiduciary as
provided by Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513 (1990), is without factual
or legal support.

There is nothing in section 76-6-513 that

places any restriction on the extent or nature of the entrustment
which a fiduciary might violate.

Defendant fails to cite any

relevant authority showing that "a fiduciary entrusted with
property" who violates her duty must, at a minimum, have either
possession or control of the property before felony sanctions can
be applied.

Further, defendant was a real estate agent entrusted

with property as a fiduciary.

Section 76-6-513 incorporates by

reference a broad definition of "property," which embraced
defendant's valuable interest in representing the sellers and
certain rights in promoting the sale of the property.
Defendant's resort to the commentaries to section 224.13 of
the Model Penal Code, apparently to show that felony sanctions
were not intended by the legislature, is without merit.

The

terms of the statute are not ambiguous and the penalties very
different than those imposed in the Model Penal Code/ therefore,
there is no need to resort to that authority in interpreting the
9

statute.

Furthermore, the clear language of the statute is

supported by legislative history showing a very deliberate intent
to apply felony sanctions to a violation of a fiduciary duty in
the circumstances of this case, i.e., a misappropriation by the.
fiduciary.
POINT II
The law requires only that the jury agree that all of the
elements the offense be 'unanimously agreed upon by the jury.
Unaminity does not require that the precise manner in which the
jury found defendant to have committed the offense be apparent
from the verdict.

Rather, there need only be sufficient evidence

on each of the theories upon which the prosecution's case was
premised.
In this case the critical statutory element at issue was
whether defendant had violated her fiduciary duty as a real
estate agent to her principals.

The jury unanimously found

beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had violated this
element/duty.

The precise manner in which defendant violated her

duty is not a statutory element of the offense of which defendant
was convicted.

Furthermore, there was more than sufficient

evidence regarding the defendant's violation of her duties of
full disclosure and loyalty a seller's agent owes to her
principal, the only two theories on which defendant requested
special verdicts, a claim which defendant has effectively
abandoned on appeal.

10

POINT III
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to
disqualify the prosecutor and her request for an evidentiary
hearing.

Defendant neither demonstrates that any of the conduct

discussed in her brief affected her substantial rights, nor that
any of it was pertinent to the trial court's pre-trial denial of
her motion and request. * Further, defendant's pre-trial
allegations in support of her request and motion failed to
adequately establish her claim and are unsupported by adequate
legal argument or authority.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT A
FIDUCIARY NEED NOT HAVE COMPLETE CONTROL OR
POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY IN ORDER TO BE
"ENTRUSTED WITH PROPERTY AS A FIDUCIARY"
UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-513 (1990)
Defendant claims that the facts proved at trial do not make
out an offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513 (1990)/ and

4

Section 76-6-513 was enacted in 1973. In its original
form the offense was a misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513
(Supp. 1973) (History: 1973 Laws, ch. 196, § 76-6-513). In 1983
the statute was amended, expressly making the offense a "theft,"
as defined in the statute, punishable under section 76-6-412.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513 (Supp. 1983) (History: 1973 Laws, ch.
91, § 1) (attached at Addendum A). This version of the statute
was in force when defendant committed the offense. The statute
was next amended, to its present version, in 1994. 1994 Laws,
ch. 70, § 1, effective May 2, 1994. Among other changes, this
most recent amendment excised the term "theft,11 while retaining
sanctions punishable under section 76-6-412. Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-513 (Cum. Supp. 1994) . Thus, the parties at trial would
have referred to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513 (1990), codifying the
1983 amendment, and all references to the 1983 amendment in this
brief are to this edition of the code.
11

therefore, her felony conviction under that statute should be
reversed.

Appellant's Br. at 9, 25.

Specifically, defendant

argues that section 76-6-513 derives from Model Penal Code
section 224.13, which punishes mishandling of entrusted property
as a misdemeanor.

She further argues that the trial court's

interpretation of the term "entrusted with property as a
fiduciary" improperly allows the imposition of felony sanctions
for mere breaches of ethical standards of conduct, an
inappropriately harsh punishment, unintended by the legislature
where defendant's "entrustment" is based neither on her
possession nor control of the property.

Defendant's claims are

without factual or legal merit.
A.

The Trial Court Properly Ruled that
Defendant was "Entrusted With Property
as a Fiduciary" under Section 76-6-513.

Defendant argued in the trial court that she could not have
been entrusted with property over which she had neither
possession nor the power to pledge, convey or encumber as though
having a power of attorney (R. 317-18, 725-26, 986). On appeal,
defendant's argument is that she is at most guilty of a conscious
breach of ethics.

In order to raise such a breach to a criminal

offense under section 76-6-513, defendant argues, an actor must
have at least possession and control of property entrusted to her
as a fiduciary.

Since she did not have such possession or

control, section 76-6-513 is not applicable to her case.
Appellant's Br. at 14-16.

Defendant's argument fails for several

reasons.
12

There is nothing in section 76-6-513 that places any
restriction on the extent or nature of the entrustment which a
fiduciary might violate.

Defendant has cited absolutely no

authority for the proposition that a fiduciary, having neither
possession nor control of property is immune from felony
sanctions for conduct which is also a breach of ethics.

Instead,

defendant, relies exclusively on hypotheticals which she
implicitly assumes could not be contemplated by the statute.
Interestingly, she does not even rely on the commentaries to the
Model Penal Code to support her argument, which, in fact, offer
no support for her position.

Most tellingly, however, defendant

was actually entrusted with property as defined by the statute.
Thus, defendant's violation of her fiduciary duty with respect to
that entrustment of property makes her conduct culpable under
section 76-6-513.
Utah's penal statutes should be broadly construed "according
to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and to
effect the objects of the law and the general purposes of Section
76-1-104."
5

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-106 (1990) .5 See State v.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-104, provides:
The provisions of this code shall be construed in
accordance with these general purposes.
(1) Forbid and prevent the commission of offenses.
(2) Define adequately the conduct and mental
state which constitute each offense and
safeguard conduct that is without fault from
condemnation as criminal.
(3) Prescribe penalties which are proportionate to the
seriousness of offenses and which permit recognition or
differences in rehabilitation possibilities among
individual offenders.
13

Framoton, 737 P.2d 183, 192 (Utah 1987) (broadly construing the
criminal simulation statute, Utah Code Ann. §76-8-518 (1990), to
include baseball mitts within its terms in the face of the
defendant's claim that the statute failed to specify the type of
goods in question and that similar criminal simulation statutes
had been interpreted narrowly as covering only unique chattels,
such as antiques or paintings).
Relevant to this discussion, the operative phrase in section
76-6-513 is

f,

deal[ing] with property that has been entrusted to

him as a fiduciary"

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513(1) (1990).

Section 76-6-513 incorporates by reference the definition of
"property" in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-4 01 (1995), which includes
"anything of value, including real estate, . . . and written
instruments or other writings representing or embodying rights
concerning real property."

Section 76-6-513(2), 6-401 (emphasis

added).
This broad definition readily encompasses the property
entrusted to defendant as a fiduciary.

It requires no citation

to authority that defendant's real estate representation of the
Bauers was property, i.e., a valuable business interest.

More

particularly, the listing agreement under which defendant was
employed gave certain enumerated powers to defendant for the
purpose of accomplishing her agency.

Among those powers were the

power to receive earnest money and place it in trust, the
(4) Prevent arbitrary or oppressive treatment of
persons accused or convicted of offenses.
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authority to obtain financial information from any mortgagee or
other party holding a lien on the property, the right to place a
sign on the property, the power to list the property through the
Multiple Listing Service of the Board of Realtors, and the
authority to install a key box on the property (see Ex. 21,
attached at Addendum B ) .
Furthermore, in addition to the powers specifically
enumerated under the listing agreement, an agent has other
implied powers which are necessary to perform the specifically
granted powers.

See generally, 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 45 (Ed..

Among these powers is the power to enter into the house at any
time for the purpose of showing the property to a potential
buyer.

Defendant testified that she showed the house to Vickie

Bassett (R. 1031), although she felt she was not acting as an
agent but rather as an interior decorator (R. 1031), a contention
the jury was free to reject.

See State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902,

904-05 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990) (jury
is free to believe or disbelieve all or part of any witness's
testimony).
In denying to defendant's motion to dismiss, the trial court
ruled that there was sufficient evidence to show that ERA and its
agents were entrusted with "a measure of control and
responsibility for this property," which included "showing the
property to people and making statements to people about the
property and . . . informing people of the response of the
Bauers" (R. 989). In denying defendant's motion to arrest
15

judgment, the trial court rejected defendant's hypothetical,
stating:
THE COURT: The Court has reviewed that
memorandum and there is some persuasive power
behind the arguments presented therein, but
the Court is not convinced by them. The
counsel for the defense has presented
different hypotheticals and said that under
-- the way the Court's interpreted the
statute, those people might be convicted of
the same offense and I agree and I think they
would appropriately be convicted of the same
offense. Whenever someone has a fiduciary
duty and is entrusted with some
responsibility, some measure of control with
regard to something of value and knowingly
fails to fulfill that duty, it's -- it should
be a criminal offense.
(R. 1101-02).6
Defendant argues at length that the commentaries to section
224.13 of the Model Penal Code explain the application of section
76-6-513 (see discussion below), that no state adopting the Model
Penal Code has construed it so broadly and that there is no
indication that the Utah legislature so intended.

Appellant's

Br. at 16. Defendant misapprehends the statute and the
legislature's power.
The general directive that criminal statute's should be
construed to forbid criminal offenses, Utah Code Ann.
6

There is no challenge to the trial court's finding that
as a real estate agent, defendant owed a fiduciary duty to the
Bauers. It is well settled in Utah case law that a "real estate
broker and his agents are the agents of a property owner from
whom the broker has a listing, and the broker and his agents owe
a fiduciary duty to the property owner.11 Kidd v. Maldonado, 688
P.2d 461 (Utah 1984)(emphasis added). Hal Taylor Associates v.
Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 748 (Utah 1982); see Hopkins v.
Wardley Corp.. 611 P.2d 1204 (Utah 1980).
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§ 76-1-104 (1995), and particularly the statute's broad
definitions with respect to property, support the conclusion that
the legislature intended to make culpable defendant's type of
conduct.

The legislature has power to declare acts as crimes and

to prescribe proper penalties.

State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683,

688 (Utah 1977); State v. Green, 793 P.2d 912, 915 (Utah App.
1990).

The only limitation on the legislative power to determine

criminal penalties is that they not be cruel or unusual.
v. Green, 757 P.2d 462, 463 (Utah 1988).

State

There is no claim that

the felony sanctions of section 76-6-513 are cruel or unusual.7
Since defendant was entrusted with property as provided in the
statute, her claim denying such entrustment is invalid and should
be rejected.
B.

1.

Section 76-6-513 is Significantly Different
than its Model Penal Code Progenitor, and
the Utah Statute Expressly Provides Felony
Sanctions for Defendant's Conduct.
Utah Courts have Looked to Other Methods of
Statutory Interpretation Only When the Plain
Language of the Statute is Ambiguous.

Section 76-6-513, provides:
(1) A person is guilty of theft, punishable
under section 76-6-412, if he deals with
property that has been entrusted to him as a
fiduciary, or property of the government or
of a financial institution, in a manner which
he knows is a violation of his duty and which
7

Defendant nominally argues that section 76-6-513 cannot
be constitutionally applied to criminalize defendant's conduct
under the facts of the case for lack of public notice.
Appellant's Br. at 16. Defendant did not raise this argument in
the trial court, and therefore the claim is waived on appeal.
State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 359 (Utah App. 1993).
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involves substantial risk of loss to the
owner or to a person for whose benefit the
property was entrusted.
(2) As used in this section "fiduciary"
includes any person carrying on fiduciary
functions on behalf of a corporation or other
organization which is a fiduciary. . . .
"[P]roperty has the meaning given in section
76-6-401(1) .
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513 (1990) .
When interpreting statutory language Utah courts first
examine a statute's plain language.

State v. Masciantonio, 850

P.2d 492, 493 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 845
(Utah 1992).

Courts will turn to other methods of statutory

interpretation only if the language of the statute is ambiguous.
Id.

Therefore, before turning to the Model Penal Code

Commentaries defendant must show that the language in section
76-6-513 is ambiguous.
The statutory elements of the offense are clearly stated,
see section 76-6-513(1), and all relevant terms are defined.

Id.

at (2). The language of the statute plainly indicates that the
culpable conduct is punishable as a theft under section 76-6-412,
which punishment may be -a felony.

Id. at (1). Therefore,

defendant's resort to the commentaries to the Model Penal Code
for aid in determining the intended scope of prohibited conduct
is misplaced.
Defendant mistakenly cites Frampton, as authority for
resorting to the Model Penal Code.

Frampton turned to the Model

Penal Code because the legislature failed to define the meaning
of "value defrauded or intended to be defrauded" under Utah Code
18

Ann. § 76-6-513(1).

The difference between what was actually

stolen and what was intended to be stolen could elevate the
offense from a felony of the third degree to a felony of the
second degree.

Frampton, 737 P.2d at 194. The legislature made

no indication which of the amounts was to be controlling.
Furthermore, there was no "meaningful legislative history
concerning 76-6-513."

Id. at 195.

It was in this context that

the court turned to the Model Penal Code for assistance in
grading the offenses of the statute.
Frampton is distinguished from the present case because the
provisions of section 76-6-513 are clear and there exists a
meaningful legislative history concerning the intended severity
of the offense.

During the floor debate on HB 281, amending

section 76-6-513, Mr. Karras, the bill's sponsor, repeatedly
stated that the purpose of the amendment was to increase to
felony levels the penalty applied to a fiduciary that
misappropriated property of another.8

Because both section

76-6-513 and its legislative history are clear that felony
penalties may be applied to an actor who, entrusted with
property, violates her fiduciary duty, resort to the comments to
* Specifically, Representative Karras stated: "We are just
trying to make some similarities, really, in saying that if
someone does misappropriate funds as a fiduciary, someone that
has responsibility for someone else's money, that the punishment
is increased."
Representative Killyard also referred to the increased
punishment by saying, "I think the real thing this bill does is
bring theft of a . . . by a fiduciary into the same
classifications of theft as it would be by anyone else. . .it
just makes it consistent throughout the Code" (see transcript of
floor debate on HB 281, attached at Addendum C).
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the Model Penal Code is unnecessary to interpret section
76-6-513.
2.

The Trial Court Correctly Recognized that
that Model Penal Code was Not Useful in
Interpreting Section 76-6-513.

In any event, because section 76-6-513 is so different from
section 224.15 of the Model Penal Code,9 neither the model
statute nor its associated commentaries throw any light on the
application of section 76-6-513 that would support defendant's
challenge concerning "entrusted with property by a fiduciary" or
the propriety of imposing felony sanctions. At trial defendant
first challenged the application of section 76-6-513 to the facts
of the case (R. 961-62), and later moved to dismiss for failure
to make out a prima facie case (R. 984-89), arguing that the
offense was patterned on section 224.13 of the Model Penal Code;
thus, defendant argued, the gravamen of the Utah offense involved
9

Section 224.13 of the Model Penal Code provides:
A person commits an offense if he applies or
disposes of property that has been entrusted
to him as a fiduciary, or property of the
government or.of a financial institution, in
a manner which he knows is unlawful and
involves substantial risk of loss or
detriment to the owner of the property or to
a person for whose benefit the property was
entrusted. The offense is a misdemeanor if
the amount involved exceeds $50; otherwise it
is a petty misdemeanor. "Fiduciary" includes
trustee, guardian, executor, administrator,
receiver and any person carrying on fiduciary
functions on behalf of a corporation or other
organization which is a fiduciary.

Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 224.13 (Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1980) (attached at Addendum D ) .
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the reckless endangerment of property entrusted to a fiduciary
(see Defendant's Trial Brief, R. 269-71, citing the Model Penal
Code and Commentaries, §224.13 comment 1 at 358-59; R. 961-62).
The trial court rejected defendant's theory:
THE COURT: I understand your theory, Mr.
Pendleton, that this statute has to be
interpreted the way the Model Penal Code
statute was interpreted as being directed at
how someone cares for property placed in
custody, but it's fairly clear to me that the
Model Penal Code history is not helpful at
all because of the substantial revisions that
the Utah Legislature made to this. It's
really quite apparent to me that this is a
different statute after the Utah Legislature
changed it. Those were not just minor
revisions and that it intended to deal not
just how someone manages the investments of
others -(R. 962). In sum, the trial court correctly recognized that
defendant's resort to the Model Penal Code was inappropriate in
interpreting section 76-6-513, and thereby correctly denied
defendant's motions for acquittal and to arrest judgment
challenging the application of the statute.
POINT II
THE ABSENCE OF A JURY INSTRUCTION REGARDING
UNANIMITY DOES NOT WARRANT REVERSAL BECAUSE
DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE RELATES TO THE METHOD
BY WHICH THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED, NOT ITS
ELEMENTS
Defendant argues that reversal is warranted because the
trial court did not require unaminity by the jurors concerning
the nature of unlawful dealing with property by a fiduciary.
Appellant's Br. at 17-18.

Specifically, defendant appears to

challenge the trial court's refusal to provide the jury with
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special verdict forms that allegedly would have identified which
aspect of defendant's fiduciary duty she breached or what conduct
constituted the breach of fiduciary duty required under section
76-6-513.

Appellant's Br, at 18. As a result of the trial

court's alleged error, defendant argues, the verdict does not
reflect the jury's unanimous conviction based on an identifiable,
viable theory of culpability.

Appellant's Br. at 20-21.

Defendant's argument is without merit for a variety of reasons.
A.

Defendant has Abandoned Her Claim on Appeal.

At trial, defendant sought special verdicts to determine
whether the jury's verdict that defendant violated her fiduciary
duty was based on a violation of the duty of full disclosure or
of the duty of loyalty (R. 1061) . On appeal, defendant argues
the trial court erred in refusing to submit the case on special
verdicts.

Appellant's Br. at 17-21.

However, defendant does not

argue on appeal under State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Utah
1991) , upon which he relies, that the evidence was insufficient
to support a verdict under breaches of either (or both) the
duties of loyalty or of full disclosure, as she must under
Johnson.

Instead, defendant argues, somewhat ambiguously, that

the trial court erred in denying his motion for acquittal, citing
the trial court's holding that there was sufficient evidence on
two grounds to support a jury finding on defendant's violation of
her duty of full disclosure to the Bauers, i.e., defendant's
failure to disclose the essentially contemporaneous
Packer/Bassett sale and-that Nicole Packer was a "cash" buyer
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without cash (R. 990). This argument fails to develop
defendant's claim at trial that special verdicts were necessary
to distinguish the basis of a jury finding on breach of fiduciary
duty, and defendant has, thereby, effectively abandoned her claim
on appeal.

See State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1307 n.2 (Utah

1986) (finding issues raised in a motion in limine but not
included in the appeal brief abandoned on appeal).

Pixton v.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 809 P.2d 746, 751 (Utah App.
1991) (failure to discuss or brief issue raised at trial
constitutes waiver of issue on appeal).

In any event,

defendant's claim is without merit.
B.

Unaminity on the Precise Manner in
Which Defendant Violated her Fiduciary
Duty was Not Required.

1.

The Law.

In State v. Russell, the Utah Supreme Court held that
unanimity was not required in a case in which all three of the
possible statutory mens rea requirements were charged in a second
degree murder conviction.

The court stated:

The decisions are virtually unanimous that a
defendant is not entitled to a unanimous
verdict on the precise manner in which the
crime was committed, or by which of several
alternative methods or modes, or under which
interpretation of the evidence, so long as
there is substantial evidence to support each
of the methods, modes or manners charged.
State v. Russell, 733 P.2d 162, 165 (Utah 1987)).

See State v.

Powell, 872 P.2d 1027, 1032 (Utah 1994) (reaffirming and quoting
Russell with approval on the same facts).
State v. Johnson, reiied on by defendant, is consistent with
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this view.

State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1159.

In Johnson, the

court reversed the defendant's conviction on one of the counts of
attempted first degree murder for lack of unanimity on the
elements where there was insufficient evidence to support both of
the statutory aggravating circumstances.

Id.

In so ruling, the

court stated:
A majority of this court has stated that a
jury must be unanimous on all elements of a
criminal charge for the conviction to stand.
See rstate v.1 Tillman, 750 P.2d [546], 585-88
(Durham, J., concurring & dissenting); id. at
591 (Zimmerman, J., concurring & dissenting);
id. at 577-80 (Stewart, J., concurring in the
result). From this premise, it follows that a
general verdict of guilty cannot stand if the
State's case was premised on more than one
factual or legal theory of the elements of
the crime and any one of those theories is
flawed or lacks the requisite evidentiary
foundation. In such circumstances, it is
impossible to determine whether the jury
agreed unanimously on all of the elements of
a valid and evidentially supported theory of
the elements of the crime. [Emphasis added.]
Id.
Defendant misconstrues Johnson to mean that for every
element constituting the offense, the jury must be unanimous
beyond a reasonable doubt as to every means by which that element
may be satisfied.

Johnson, rather, demands only that where a

general verdict of guilt is returned there be sufficient evidence
for each factual theory relied on by the prosecution.
In this case, there is only one statutory element at issue
in defendant's challenge on unanimity, i.e., violation of a
fiduciary duty.

The instructions, collectively, required the

jury to unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant
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had violated her fiduciary duty before it could render a verdict
of guilt (jury instructions #8, #9, #14; R. 299-98, 293, attached
at Addendum E).

The jury found defendant guilty and a polling

showed the verdict unanimous (see verdict, R. 308; R. 1089-90).
2.

There was More Than Sufficient Evidence
to Support the .Two Prosecution Theories
for Which Defendant Sought Special Verdicts.

Assuming that defendant's references to the trial court's
denying defendant's motion for acquittal can be regarded as
relevant to her claim on appeal, the claim fails to show that the
two theories on which she suggested special verdicts be given the
jury were defective under Johnson.

The trial court gave an

instruction defining the duties of loyalty and disclosure (jury
instruction #11, R. 296, attached at Addendum E).

On appeal

defendant fails entirely to marshal the evidence supporting
defendant's violation of these two theories upon which the State
premised its case. Moreover, defendant attacks only the
sufficiency of evidence to support the failure to disclose that
Packer lacked cash.

Appellant's Br. at 21. Thus, defendant

apparently concedes that there was sufficient evidence to support
a finding that defendant had violated her duty of disclosure by
failing to inform the Bauers that she already had a buyer, i.e.,
the Bassetts, waiting in the wings to purchase the Bauers'
residence for $58,000 at 13% interest.

Indeed, this was only one

of the many facts supporting the prosecution's theory of
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nondisclosure.
Further, defendant's argument that there was insufficient
evidence to support a finding that she did not disclose that
Packer was without cash is nothing but a strawman argument.

For

the purposes of assessing sufficiency on the factual theories
under Johnson, the question is whether the prosecution's case was
premised on Packer's financial condition.
at 1159.

See Johnson, 821 P.2d

Packer's financial condition was, at most, one fact

among a great many to support the prosecution's case for
nondisclosure.11

The prosecution did not even identify this

particular fact as a theory in arguing defendant's violation of
her fiduciary duty to the jury in closing.12
10

Only a few of the facts also supporting defendant's
violation of her duty of full disclosure were: Nicole Packer was
merely a pawn in the transaction standing in for defendant in the
transaction, one who was only eighteen years old, had neither the
funds nor the intent to buy a home, and was kept substantially
ignorant of her sale to the Bassetts until the closing (R. 829,
831, 835-41, 850); the Bauer/Packer transaction was virtually
contemporaneous with the Packer/Bassett transaction, since the
parties were signing papers within hours of one another (R. 74445); defendant was effectively hiding the Packer/Bassett sale by
neither informing ERA or claiming a commission (R. 747, 780, 790,
801, 807, 821-22); defendant should have passed on William's
offer of $45,000 to the Bauers (R. 824); defendant failed to pass
on to the Bauers the Bassetts' $58,000 offer at 13% interest (R.
911) .
11

Supra, n.10.

12

The State's theory at trial was that defendant had
violated her fiduciary duty to the Bauers by failing to disclose
that (1) the property was being sold to defendant's secretary,
Nicole Packer, (2) the Bassetts were willing to pay $55,000 at
thirteen percent interest for the house (3) that Williams had
$45,000 available for the purchase of the Bauers' house or (4)
that an additional commission of $4,697 would be split between
defendant, her husband and Nicole Packer (R. 1075).
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Finally, in referencing alleged deficiencies in the trial
court's view of the evidence, defendant's argument on appeal
focusses only on the failure to fully disclose.

She entirely

fails to show how giving a special verdict on the failure of the
duty of loyalty would have distinguished the facts supporting
that theory from the theory that defendant failed to fulfill her
duty of disclosure.

In fact, defendant never provided the trial

court with the special verdict forms that he requested (see
defendant's proposed jury instructions, R. 248-61).
In any event, there was more than sufficient evidence to
prove that defendant had violated her duty of loyalty.

The trial

court defined this duty as the fiduciary's obligation to put the
seller's interests ahead of her own (see jury instruction #11, R.
296).

The most powerful fact in support of this particular

theory upon which the prosecution premised its case (R. 1075),
was that defendant obtained $4,697.50 in commission, i.e., left
over funds following the various transactions, which she split
with her husband and Nicole Packer (R. 730, 778-79, 790, 834) .
In sum, there was more than sufficient evidence to support
the prosecution's theories upon which defendant requested special
verdicts, and therefore, defendant's claim that the general
verdict of guilt cannot stand.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT EXERCISED APPROPRIATE
DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR
AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HER MOTION TO
DISQUALIFY THE PROSECUTOR
Defendant contends that the lower court erred when it denied
her motion for an evidentiary hearing on her motion to disqualify
the prosecutor.

She summarily asserts that the trial court was

required to hold an evidentiary hearing "to test the truthfulness
of the allegations."
A.

Appellant's Br. at 25.

Defendant's Claim is Waived on Appeal.

In support of her claim that the trial court erred in
denying a hearing on the motion, defendant sets out what she
claims are examples of the prosecutor's "intent to obtain a
conviction at the expense of affording the defendant a fair
trial."

Appellant's Br. at 22-24.

She then closes her argument

by submitting that "the alleged conduct in fact disqualifies the
prosecutor[.]"

Appellant's Br. at 25. To the extent she means

that the conduct argued in her brief disqualifies the prosecutor,
she has not met her burden of proving her allegations.

She does

not demonstrate that these examples constitute misconduct which
"affected a substantial right of the defendant."
at 1228.

Gray, 851 P.2d

Further, none of the examples was before the lower

court at the time it ruled on defendant's pre-trial request for a
hearing.

Consequently, these examples have no bearing on whether
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the trial court's denial of defendant's motion was erroneous.13
To the extent she claims that the pre-trial conduct alleged
below in support of her motion for an evidentiary hearing
disqualifies the prosecutor, defendant did not adequately
establish the claim below and fails to make any attempt to
establish it in her appellate brief.

She makes no argument

concerning why an evidentiary hearing was required given the
allegations and arguments before the lower court at the time of
its ruling.

Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (9); see State v. Stercrer, 808

P.2d 122, 125 n.2 (Utah App. 1991) (declining to rule on
arguments unsupported by meaningful analysis).

Moreover,

defendant has not appended to her brief the findings of fact that
would make clear the basis for the trial court's denial of her
motion and request for an evidentiary hearing, thereby depriving
this court of the ability to review the correctness of that
determination.

Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(11)(C).

Accordingly, this

Court should not consider her claim of error.
B.

Defendant Fails to Show that the
Prosecutor Should have been Disqualified.

Defendant moved to 'disqualify the prosecutor shortly after
13

Even if the court were to find the alleged instances of
prosecutorial misconduct at trial were relevant, a clear reading
of the record shows the instances cited by the appellant can not
be construed as misconduct. Each of the defense objections cited
were made when the prosecutor inadvertently referred to the offer
from Mrs. Williams as a cash offer, when it was in reality an
offer to purchase a mortgage. It is worthy to note that each
time the prosecutor rephrased the question, the question was
allowed and was not objected to by defendant (R. 912, 935).
Consequently, the evidence admitted was that which the jury was
entitled to consider in reaching its verdict. State v. Emmett,
839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992).
29

the preliminary hearing, alleging that the prosecutor had
committed perjury in the statement of probable cause, "accosted"
defense counsel in the courthouse during a preliminary hearing
recess "apparently for the purpose of some physical altercation,"
and harbored "an irrational and unjustifiable animus" toward
defendant and her husband (R. 68-70).

After the State filed its

response to the disqualification motion (R. 75-104), defendant
sought an evidentiary hearing because "the State's response to
defendant's motion raises several factual issues relating to [the
prosecutor's] good faith or lack thereof" which defendant felt
could only be resolved in an evidentiary hearing (R. 114).
At a hearing on defendant's motion,14 the trial court
listened to both sides, asked defense counsel for Utah authority
for removing the prosecutor (Hng. at 37),15 to which defense
counsel replied, "Only the Canon of Ethics, Your Honor" (Hng. at
The trial court then denied the motion for an evidentiary
hearing, providing the following reasoning:
I do not appreciate attorneys dealing with
one another in less than professional
14

Defendant's husband, Kent Winward, made the same motion
to disqualify the prosecutor and the motions in both cases were
heard at the same time. The only copy of the transcript to the
above-referenced hearing is a part of the record in Kent
Winward's appeal, no. 940530-CA, though supplemented to this
record by a ruling of the district court (see Ruling on Motion
for Modification of Record, unpaginated, final document in
district court record in this case), and can be located in that
case. Because the trial court sealed the record of the hearing,
the State has not appended copies of the transcript to this
brief.
15

To which defense counsel replied, "Only the Canon of
Ethics, Your Honor" (Hng. at 37).
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settings. It is unseemly for attorneys to
shout at one another, for attorneys to be in
close contact such as they are quoted to be
in each other's face. I don't like to see
it. I don't like to see it operating in my
courtroom. I don't like to see it operating
in litigation over which I am presiding.
It is the specific order of the Court to
both counsel, and entered in the minutes of
this case, that both counsel will deal with
one another without voices raised, that they
shall not approach each other any closer than
one yard, 36 inches. That their voices shall
not be audible more than 30 feet away from
any conversation that they have. As I have
indicated, I'm not going to put up with
sandbox squabbles. We've got a lawsuit here
that has serious implications for the State
of Utah and for these defendants, and we're
going to treat it as the kind of serious
lawsuit that it is.
(Hng. at 44-45).

A review of all of the allegations leveled

against the prosecutor by defense counsel reveals that the
defense offered no concrete evidence, supplied no witness names,
and gave no documents supporting her allegations (Hng. at 34-36).
Based on such unsupported, conclusory accusations the court was
perfectly justified in refusing to grant the defendant's motion.
In her memorandum of authority at the pre-trial hearing and
on appeal, defendant relies on a single case to support her right
to have an evidentiary hearing.

In State v. Marcotte. 86 So.2d

186, 188 (1956), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the trial
court should have heard evidence on defendant's motion to recuse
the district attorney.

However, the decision was based on a

local rule of criminal procedure "providing the causes for
recusation of a district attorney" and upon a single prior
Louisiana case, State v. Tate, 171 So. 108 (1936), with which the
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author of the opinion and the dissenting justice disagreed.

A

third justice was absent and did not take part in the decision.
Utah has no equivalent rule or precedent.

There is no basis

upon which defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on her
allegations.

The prosecutor provided to the trial court all the

information on which he based the challenged assertions in the
probable cause statement and evidence refuting defendant's claims
of personal vindictiveness (R. 75-104) (attached at Addendum F).
A review of those documents establishes that the prosecutor
presented the bases for probable cause in good faith and to the
best of his ability based on the information available to him at
the time.

Those documents also effectively refute defendant's

claims of prosecutorial animosity towards them.

Defendant's

allegations reflect at most ethical questions more appropriately
addressed through the state bar--a method recognized by defendant
but ultimately rejected by her (Hng. at 41-42).

In fact,

defendant made the same -defense allegations of prosecutorial
misconduct complained of at this hearing to the Attorney General
and the State Bar (Hng. R. 29). However, the State Bar took no
action against Mr. Burns because Mr. Pendleton refused to sign an
affidavit, under oath, in connection with the complaint (R. 42).
The trial court had before it sufficient information from
both sides to determine that an evidentiary hearing was not
appropriate and that the case could proceed without a
substituting another prosecutor.

Defendant's bald assertion on

appeal that the conduct she alleged against the prosecutor "in
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fact disqualifies the prosecutor" does nothing to establish her
right either to an evidentiary hearing or to disqualification of
the prosecutor.

Accordingly, defendant's allegation of error is

without merit.
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND WRITTEN OPINION
Defendant's claim that the facts of the case do not make out
a public offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-513 (Supp. 1993),
warrant oral argument and a full-blown opinion to further develop
Utah law in this area.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully
requests that defendant's conviction be affirmed.the trial
court's ruling and defendant's sentences be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/T

day of July, 1995.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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day of July, 1995.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

76-1-101

CRIMINAL CODE
GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section
76-1-404.
76-1-406.

Concurrent jurisdiction — Proaecution in other jurisdiction
barring prosecution in state.
Subsequent
prosecution
not

Section
76-1-502.
76-1-603.
76-1-604*.

barred — Circumstances.

Negating defense by allegation or
proof— When not required.
Presumption of fact
Affirmative defense presented by
defendant.

Parts
76-1-601.

Parte

Burden of Proof
Presumption of innocence — "Element of the offense" denned.

Definitions
76-1-601.

Definitions.

PARTI
INTRODUCTORY PROVISIONS
76-1*101. Short title.
This title shall he known and may be cited as the "Utah Criminal Code."
History: C. 1963, 70-1-101, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, | 76-1-101.
Croaa-Refereneee. — Stats Commission on

Criminal and Juvenile Justice, | 63-26-1 at
aeq.

76-1-102. Effective date.
This code shall become effective on July 1,1973.
History: C. 1963, 76-1-103, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196,ft 764-102.

76-1-103. Application of code — Offense prior to effective
date.
(1) The provisions of this code shall govern the construction of, the punishment for, and defenses against any offense defined in this code or, except where
otherwise specifically provided or the context otherwise requires, any offense
defined outside this code; provided such offense was committed after the
effective date of this code.
(2) Any offense committed prior to the effective date of this code shall be
governed by the law, statutory and non-statutory, existing at the time of
commission thereof, except that a defense or limitation on punishment
available under this code shall be available to any defendant tried or retried
after the effective date. An offense under the laws of this state shall be deemed
to have been committed prior to the effective date of this act if any of the
elements of the offense occurred prior thereto.
History: C. 1953,76-1-108, enacted by L»
1973, ch. 196, 8 76-1-103.

2

76-1-104

NOTES TO DECISIONS
accused entitled to benefit of lesser punishment
if penalty for offense is reduced before imposition of sentence; therefore, one convicted of
passing check without sufficient funds in violation of former Section 76-20-11 was entitled to
be sentenced under less severe provisions of
Section 76-6-606 of the new Criminal Code.
State v. Saxton, 30 Utah 2d 466, 619 P.2d 1340
(1974).
In sentencing defendant who had pled guilty
to sodomy under former Section 76-63-22, trial
judge was not required to take into account
reduced penalty for the crime under new statute, since it divided former offense into crimes
of "sodomy" and "forcible sodomy," so that technically the penalty for the crime of which defendant was convicted was not reduced, and
because trial judge did take change in law into
account and held hearing to determine which
provision of new code applied to defendant's
act, defendant could not complain of entry of
sentence under "forcible sodomy" provisions'.
State v. Atkinson, 632 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976).

ANALY8I8

Offense defined outside Criminal Code.
Sentencing.
—After effective date of Code.

Under statute subsequently amended.
Offense defined outside Criminal Code.
The Controlled Substances Act expressly and
specifically establishes the offense of arranging
for the distribution of a controlled substance;
therefore, pursuant to former ft 68-37-19 and
this section, defendant was required to be
charged with that offense under ft 68-378(lXaXiv) of the Controlled Substances Act,
and it was error to charge him under ft 70-2202 of the Criminal Code. State v. Hicken, 669
P.2d 1038 (Utah 1983).
A person cannot be charged with aiding and
abetting another when he or she handles the
negotiations and price of a controlled substance, but must instead be charged with
agreeing, consenting, offering, or negotiating to
distribute a controlled substance as specifically
provided in ft 68-37-8(1 XaXiv). State v. Scott,
732 P.2d 117 (Utah 1987).
Whenever culpable conduct arises under the
Controlled Substance Act and is specifically
defined by it, trial courts must reject instructions to the jury under more general provisions
outside the act. SUte v. Scott, 732 P.2d 117
(Utah 1987).

Under statute subsequently amended.
Law in effect at time of sentencing, not law in
effect at time of incarceration, governed sentence to be served; defendant who was convicted and sentenced for forgery before amendment of applicable statute to provide a lesser
penalty but who was not incarcerated until
after the amendment was not entitled to be
resentenced under the amended statute; sentencing under old statute was not a denial of
equal protection. Harris v. Smith, 641 P.2d 343
(Utah 1976).

Sentencing.
—Alter effective date of Code.
Nonstatutory law existing at the time of
commission of crime included decisions holding

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.8. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law ft 26.
Key Number*. — Criminal Law *» 1206.

Am. Jar. 2d.—21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
17.

76-1-104. Purposes and principles pf construction.
The provisions of this code shall be construed in accordance with these
general purposes.
'
(1) Forbid and prevent the commission of offenses.
(2) Define adequately the conduct and mental state which constitute
each offense and safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal.
(3) Prescribe penalties which are proportionate to the seriousness of
offenses and which permit recognition or differences in rehabilitation
possibilities among individual offenders.
(4) Prevent arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons accused oi
convicted of offenses.
3

76-1-105

CRIMINAL COM

History: C. 1953, 73-1-104, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196,1 76-1-104.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Proportionate penalties.
Determining whether the penalty is proporA case-by-case (comparative) proportionality tionate to the crime requires a careful and
review was not required in response to defen- thoughtful consideration of the individual dedant's contention that his sentence of death fendant and the circumstances surrounding his
was disproportionate to the crime committed, crime. Focus on the individual defendant and
the immunity granted his accomplice, and the his acts is called for in this section, not cornsentences meted out in other first-degree mur- parison with other criminals and their crimes,
der cases. State v. Tillman, 760 P.2d 546 (Utah State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273 (Utah 1989),
1987), cert, denied, Tillman v. Cook,
U.S. cert denied, 469 U.S. 988,110 S. Ct. 1837,108
, 114 S. Ct 706,126 U Ed. 2d 671 (1994).
L. Ed. 2d 965 (1990).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 3d.—21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
ftft 9,18.

Common law crimes are abolished and no conduct is a crime unless made so
by this code, other applicable statute or ordinance.
History: C. 1953, 76-1-106, enacted by L.
1973, eh. 196,1 76-1-106; 1974, eh. 32,1 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Common law crimes abolished.
The Criminal Code explicitly abolishes all
common law crimes. State v. Maestas, 662 P.2d
903 (Utah 1982).
Necessity for statute or ordinance.
Conduct, no matter how reprehensible, was
not punishable in absence of a law authorizing

punishment and clearly covering the conduct
°&*n City v. McLaughlin, 5 Utah 387, 16 P.
721 f 1888)
^
ginoe ^ j , ,
ctimtB
abo|W)ed
and court could not impose penalties unless the
penalties were authorized by statute or ordinance, statute or ordinance that failed to attach
penalty to crime or offenses was inoperative.
Roe v. Lundstrom, 89 Utah 620, 67 P.2d 1128
(1936).
Cited in State v. Gardiner, 814 E2d 668
(Utah 1991).

76-1-1U /

History: C. 1953, 76-1-106, enacted by L. ftft 68-2-8, 68-2-9, 68-3-6.
1973, ch. 196,ft 76-1-106.
Statutes in derogation of the common law not
Cross-References. — Effect of repeal on strictly construed, ft 68-3-2.
prosecution of offenses already committed,
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Lewis, 62 Utah 7,172 P. 286 (1918).

City ordinances.
Extension of time.
Cited.
r»t*- _*II
City ordinances.
Statute providing that criminal statutes
were not to be strictly construed applied to city
ordinances, and ordinance prohibiting sale of
intoxicating liquors was given liberal construetion so as to uphold its validity. Salina City v.

C.J.8. —- 22 C.J.S. Criminal Lawft25.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *» 13.

76-1-105. Common law crimes abolished.

ANALYSIS
~
t _ x v . i i v~i
Common law crimes abolished.
N e » » i * for .tatuto or ordin.DC.

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Extension of time.
Notwithstanding statute providing that
criminal statutes were not to be strictly construed, it was beyond court's power to extend
statutory time for filing motion for new trial.
S t a t e v S a w y € r 54 U t a h 75 1 8 2 p. 206 (1919).
Cited in State v. Jones, 735 P.2d 399 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987); State v. Jaimez, 817 P.2d 822
(Utah Ct App. 1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
ftft 10,18.

GJJ9. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Lawft26.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law • » 12.

76-1-107. Procedure — Applicable provisions — Military
codes, enforcement of court orders, and liability
for civil damages not affected.
(1) Except 08 otherwise provided, the procedure governing the accusatioi
prosecution, conviction, and punishment of offenders and offenses is n<
regulated by this act but by the code of criminal procedure.
(2) This code does not affect any power conferred by law upon any cour
martial or other military authority or officer to impose and inflict punishmei
upon offenders violating military codes or laws; nor does it affect any power
a court to punish for contempt or to employ any sanction authorized by law f
the enforcement of an order or a civil judgment or decree.
(3) This act does not bar, suspend, or otherwise affect any right or liabili
to damages, penalty, forfeiture, impeachment, or other remedy authorized
law to be recovered or enforced in a civil action, administrative proceeding,
otherwise, regardless of whether the conduct involved in the proceedi
constitutes an offense defined in this code.

I
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.—21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
ft 7.

76-1 -106.

C.J.S. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 24.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «» 11.

Strict construction rule not applicable.

The rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed shall not apply to this
code, any of its provisions, or any offense defined by the laws of this state. All
provisions of this code and offenses defined by the laws of this state shall be
construed according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and to
effect the objects of the law and general purposes of Section 76-1-104.

History: C. 1953, 76-1-107, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, ft 76-1-107.
Cross-References. — Civil and criminal
remedies do not merge, ft 68-3-4.

Contempt generally, ft 78-32-1 et seq.
Criminal procedure, Title 77.
Military court, ft 39-6-16.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Contempt proceeding.
Former Penal Code provision similar to Subsection (2) of this section expressed no distinction between a contempt proceeding in the

nature of a civil proceeding and one in
nature of a criminal proceeding. Forema
Foreman, 111 Utah 113,176 P.2d 165 (194

5
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CRIMINAL CODE

who accosted the victim with a knife and club
and demanded to know where she kept her
silver and gold. State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 691
(Utah 1988).
Erroneous admission of defendant's prior
convictions of retail theft and attempted burglary was harmless, where the state presented
sufficient evidence and eyewitness testimony to
prove that defendant committed the robbery.
State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646 (1989).
Evidence, upon which the jury could reasonably find that the defendant solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided another person in the aggravated
robbery of a jewelry store with the requisite
intent, was sufficient to support the defendant's
conviction of aggravated robbery. State v. Webb,
790 P.2d 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
There was sufficient evidence for the jury
reasonably to find that the defendant committed the crime of aggravated robbery, where two
witnesses positively identified the defendant as
the robber, and a hat and a coat found inside
the stolen car used in the robbery matched the
witnesses' description of the clothing worn by
the robber. State v. Humphrey, 793 P.2d 918
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Evidence was sufficient to support conviction
of robbery notwithstanding one eyewitness's
initial identification of another person as robber. See State v. Hayes, 860 P.2d 968 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993).
Eyewitness identification.
Although the only evidence convicting defendant of aggravated robbery was the eyewitness
identification of the victim, it was not prejudicial error for the trial court to refuse to instruct
the jury as to the special pitfalls of eyewitness
identification. State v. Newton, 681 P.2d 833
(Utah 1984).

and cause of accusation, at least in absence of
demand for bill of particulars; there was but
one crime of robbery, and words such as "by
means offeree or fear" were unnecessary. State
v. Bobbins, 102 Utah 119, 127 P2d 1042 (1942).
In prosecution for robbery (by force of arms),
variance between complaint filed in city court
and information filed in district court as to
ownership of property taken was not fatal
where both alleged that defendant took property from possession or presence of same person. State v. Perry, 27 Utah 2d 48, 492 P.2d
1349 (1972).

Intent.
Intent to commit crime of robbery (using
firearms) or assault with intent to commit murder could be found from proof of facts from
which it reasonably could have been believed
that such was intent of defendant, because
additional facts may be inferred from those
shown directly by evidence. State v. Kazda, 15
Utah 2d 313, 392 P.2d 486 (1964).
Recent possession of stolen property.
Statute making unexplained recent possession of stolen property prima facie evidence of
larceny applied to offense of robbery when
larceny and robbery were committed in same
transaction. State v. Donovan, 77 Utah 343,294
P. 1108 (1931).
Recovery of property by force.
Defendant, even if he took money from another by force or fear, was not guilty of robbery
(with revolver), regardless of whatever other
offense he might have committed in taking of
money, if money actually belonged to him, and
its possession by person from whom it was
taken was wrongful since, in such case, animus
furandi element of robbery was lacking. People
v. Hughes, 11 Utah 100, 39 P. 492 (1895).

Included offense.
Grand larceny conviction was improper when Sentence.
accompanied by conviction of robbery (with —Use of a firearm.
pistol) for same conduct since grand larceny
The legislature's 1975 amendment of the
was included offense in robbery charge. State v.
Montayne, 18 Utah 2d 38, 414 P. 2d 958, cert, aggravated robbery statute to specify use of a
denied, 385 U.S. 939,87 S. Ct. 305,17 L. Ed. 2d firearm, coupled with the subsequent enactment of the general sentence enhancement pro218 (1966).
visions, created no ambiguity over what penUnder the test for separateness found in alty the legislature intended for robbery
Subsection 76-1-402(3), aggravated robbery be- committed with a firearm. The legislature was
comes a lesser included offense of first degree merely increasing the degree of a robbery comfelony murder when the predicate felony for mitted with the enumerated instruments of
first degree murder is aggravated robbery. violence. State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65 (Utah Ct.
State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986).
App. 1990).
Aggravated robbery is one of the predicate
offenses of felony murder. State v. McCovey, 803 Threatening to use weapon.
P.2d 1234 (Utah 1990).
Threatening to use a dangerous weapon during the commission of a robbery, regardless of
Indictment or information.
whether one actually possesses such a weapon,
Information for robbery (with firearm appar- is
sufficient for a charge of aggravated robbery
ently in pocket of robber) that used the word under this section. State v. Adams, 830 P.2d 310
"robbed" sufficiently informed accused of nature (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
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OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY
Unloaded
firearm.
Aggravated robbery may be committed with
an unloaded firearm. State v. Turner, 572 P.2d
387 (Utah 1977).
™* J • a* *
rw «ooojoiom»u
•J S ? ^ ^ n W ^ P M
III m ^ K
1985); State v. DeJesus, 712 P.2d 246 (Utah
1985); State v. Gutierrez, 714 P.2d 295 (Utah
1986); State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261 (Utah

76-6-401

1986); State v. Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375 (Utah
1986); State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879 (Utah
1988); State v. Whittle, 780 P2d 819 (1989);
State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188 (Utah 1990);
State v. Severance, 828 P,2d 1066 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992); State v. Lee, 831 P.2d 114 (Utah Ct.
A** 1Q Q 9 Y
App
* ™*Z)'

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 67 Am. Jur. 2d Robbery § 3.
C.J.S. — 77 C.J.S. Robbery $ 27.
AX.R. — Fact that gun was unloaded as
affecting criminal responsibility, 68 A.L.R.4ih
507.

Admissibility of expert opinion stating
whether a particular knife was, or could have
been, the weapon used in a crime, 83 A.L.R.4th
660.
Key Numbers. — Robbery •» 11.

PART 4
THEFT
76-6-401. Definitions.
For the purposes of this part:
(1) "Property" means anything of value, including real estate, tangible
and intangible personal property, captured or domestic animals and birds,
written instruments or other writings representing or embodying rights
concerning real or personal property, labor, services, or otherwise containing anything of value to the owner, commodities of a public utility nature
such as telecommunications, gas, electricity, steam, or water, and trade
secrets, meaning the whole or any portion of any scientific or technical
information, design, process, procedure, formula or invention which the
owner thereof intends to be available only to persons selected by him.
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring about a transfer of
possession or of some other legally recognized interest in property,
whether to the obtainer or another; in relation to labor or services, to
secure performance thereof; and in relation to a trade secret, to make any
facsimile, replica, photograph, or other reproduction.
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object:
(a) lb withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or
to use under such circumstances that a substantial portion of its
economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, would be lost; or
(b) To restore £he property only upon payment of a reward or other
compensation; or
(c) lb dispose of the property under circumstances that make it
unlikely that the owner will recover it.
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" means, but is not necessarily limited to, conduct heretofore defined or known as common-law
larceny by trespassory taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee,
and embezzlement.
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person intentionally:
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of law or
fact that is false and that the actor does not believe to be true and that
is likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction; or
191
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76-6-511. Defrauding creditors.
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if:
(1) He destroys, removes, conceals, encumbers, transfers, or otherwise
deals with property subject to a security interest with a purpose to hinder
enforcement of that interest; or
(2) Knowing that proceedings have been or are about to be instituted
for the appointment of a person entitled to administer property for the
benefit of creditors, he:
(a) Destroys, removes, conceals, encumbers, transfers, or otherwise
deals with any property with a purpose to defeat or obstruct the claim
of any creditor, or otherwise to obstruct the operation of any law
relating to administration of property for the benefit of creditors; or
(b) Presents to any creditor or to an assignee for the benefit of
creditors, orally or in writing, any statement relating to the debtor's
estate, knowing that a material part of such statement is false.
History: C. 1953, 76-6-511, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, ft 76-6-511.

Cross-References. — Conveyance to hinder
or defraud, §§ 25-6-1 et seq., 70A-2-402.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraudulent
Conveyances § 2.
C.J.S. — 37 CJ.S. Fraudulent Conveyances
5 4 6 9A.L.R. — Elements and proof of crime of im-

proper sale, removal, concealment, or disposal
of property subject to security interest under
UCC, 48 A.L.R.4th 819.
Key Numbers. — Fraudulent Conveyances
*» 329.

76-6-512. Acceptance of deposit by insolvent financial institution.
A person is guilty of a felony of the third degree if:
(1) As an officer, manager, or other person participating in the direction of a financial institution, as defined in Section 76-6-411, he receives
or permits receipt of a deposit or other investment knowing that the
institution is or is about to become unable, from any cause, to pay its
obligations in the ordinary course of business; and
(2) He knows that the person making the payment to the institution is
unaware of such present or prospective inability.

OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY

76-6-515

76-6-513. Unlawful dealing with property by fiduciary.
(1) A person is guilty of theft, punishable under Section 76-6-412, if he
deals with property that has been entrusted to him as a fiduciary, or property
of the government or of a financial institution, in a manner which he knows is
a violation of his duty and which involves substantial risk of loss to the owner
or to a person for whose benefit the property was entrusted.
(2) As used in this section "fiduciary" includes any person carrying on fiduciary functions on behalf of a corporation or other organization which is a
fiduciary. "Government" and "financial institution" have the meanings given
in Section 76-6-411; "property" has the meaning given in Section 76-6-401(1).
History: C. 1953, 76-6-513, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-513; 1983, ch. 91, ft 1.
Compiler's Notes. — Section 76-6-411, re-

ferred to in Subsection (2), was repealed in
1974.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Note, Utah's Statute
Permitting Limits on Corporate Directors' Lia-

bility: A Guide for Lawyers and Directors,
1988 Utah L. Rev. 847.

76-6-514. Bribery or threat to influence contest.
A person is guilty of a felony of the third degree if:
(1) With a purpose to influence any participant or prospective participant not to give his best efforts in a publicly exhibited contest, he confers
or offers or agrees to confer any benefit upon or threatens any injury to a
participant or prospective participant; or
(2) With a purpose to influence an official in a publicly exhibited contest to perform his duties improperly, he confers or offers or agrees to
confer any benefit upon or threatens any injury to such official; or
(3) With a purpose to influence the outcome of a publicly exhibited
contest, he tampers with any person, animal, or thing contrary to the
rules and usages purporting to govern the contest; or
(4) He knowingly solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit, the
giving of which would be criminal under [Subsection] (1) or (2).
History: C. 1953, 76-6-514, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, ft 76-6-514.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

History: C. 1963, 76-6-512, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, ft 76-6-612.

Compiler's Notes. — Section 76-6-411,
cited in Subsection (1), was repealed in 1974.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 10 Am. Jur. 2d Banks
* 242.
C.J.S. — 9 CJ.S. Banks and Banking § 156.

Key Numbers. — Banks and Banking •»
82(2), 83, 84.
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Am. Jur. 2d. — 12 Am. Jur. 2d Bribery
S 16.

C.J.S. — 11 CJ.S. Bribery ft 2.
Key Numbers. — Bribery «» 2.

76-6-515. Using or making slugs.
(1) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if:
(a) With a purpose to defraud the supplier of property or a service
offered or sold by means of a coin machine, he inserts, deposits, or uses a
slug in that machine; or
(b) He makes, possesses, or disposes of a slug with the purpose of enabling a person to use it fraudulently in a coin machine.
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ADDENDUM B

scAitop*
Using D a t e ^ l£l$_Z'

Expired OdH^^I^^^

^:.rr*

Geographic Area 0 /

O Residential Condo
O Residential Acreage

POSSESSION (Poss)
CONSTRUCTION (Const)
BUILT-INS(Bltln)
1 A) Immediate (Now)
1 ^6 Frame (Frm)
1 ) Oven/Range (OR)
2 0 30 Days (30)
2 «3 Stucco (Stuc)
2 ) Microwave (MW)
3 O Call Listing Office/Nego (C-LO) 3 1) Bnck (Brk)
Occupant_
, Phone
3 > Refrigerator
4 O Upon Closing (UpCIs)
4 ) Masonite (Mas)
4 ) Central Vacuum (CV)
OMQKL
Street fOP
W^ST
Property Address «
/f/^//^
5 ) Cedar (Ced)
5 ) Intercom (IN)
6 ) Rock (Rock)
OCCUPANCY (Occ)
6 ) Dishwasher (DW)
CA&SM
tofomls/
2ip_
Coordinate
Zone
7 ) Aluminum (Alum)
7 ) Garbage Disposal (D)
1 O Owner (Own)
8 ) Cinder Block (CndBlk)
Schools Elem ' / l /
8 ) Trash Compactor (TC)
to*«xS1/fl/)Le
High Ctfmf
_
2 O Renter (Rent)
9 ) Shingle (Shing)
3 X Vacant (Vent)
10O
Asbestos
(Asb)
EXTRAS
INSIDE (Exlin)
4 O Management Co (MgmtCo)
11 ) Log (Log)
1 ) Entry (Ent)
. % Dues $_
&V
Pay Disc
APPOINTMENT (App)
12 ) Concrete (Con)
2 ) Coal or Wood Heater (CWH)
Price
13 ) Steel Siding (Steel)
1 O Call Owner (C-Own)
3 )AirCond Electric (ACE)
CCCode
Tax I D .
- Dup
a(lLBtlf> ott,C€ CLO
Taxes $ _
14
)
Vinyl
Siding
(Vin)
4
)AirCond-Gas(ACG)
2X?
9
(
)
5 )AirCond Evaporative (ACV)
3 0 t a l l Occupant (C-Occ)
Loan Type
Pmt $
Int
Loan Bal
6 )GasFAHeat(GFAH)
4 O Key at Listing Office (KLO)
UTILITIES (Util)
7 ) Electric Heat (EH)
1 « Culinary Wtr-City (CWC)
5 O Use Keybox (KB)
Lender
2'^Culinary Wtr Well (CWW) 8 ) Hot Water Heat (HWH)
6 O No Appt Necessary (NAN)
Loan Type
Pmt $
Other Loans
Int
3 t) Culinary Wtr-Other (CWO) 9 J Space Heater ( S P W L ^ j ™
7 O Management Co (MgmtCo)
. Down to Assm $_
Lender
Add Encumbrances.
4/fSewer(Swr)
10>tf Oil Heat (OilH) C
Citf*.*
5 ) Septic Tank (Sptc)
11 ) Propane Heal (PrpH)
ASSESSMENTS
(Asses)
Annl Expense $_
Cap Rate
Annl Income $
1 & Paid (AsPd)
6 ) Natural Gas (NtGas)
12 ; Water Heater Gas (WHG)
7 XJ Electricity (Elec)
2{>NotPatd(AsNtPd)
M
Water Heater Electric (WHE)
8
)
Secondary
Water
(Sec
Wtr)
14 ) Water Heater Solar (WHS)
l9r
, r n a t , o n ,rr
15J£
Window
Covenno (WC)
ASSUME
EXISTING
LOAN
(AEL)
9X 9
( )
Lot Size
4g>o A
I _5 J>
Acres.
1(7? Irrigation Wen (IrrW)
16^> Floor Covering (FC)
~> Yes at current rate (YCR)
FR
DR
LDRY FRPL
Approx Sq Ft
BR
BTHS
LR
KIT
) Yes with Int Increase (Yll)
17 ) Wtr Softener Owned (WSO)
) Yes with discount (YD)
CARPORT CRPT)
18 ) Wtr Softener Rented (WSR)
) Yes buyer to qualify (YBkQ)
1 )lCar(lCar)
19 ) Solar Heat (Solar)
M
%
f
/
^No(N)
2 )2Car(2Car)
20 ) Security System (SEC)
f Call Listing Agent (LA)
3 )3Car(3Car)
21 ) Heal Pump (HP)
4 > Attached (Att)
% Basement Finished
.% Basement Sq Ft Finished.
TERMS OF SALE )Terms)
5 ) Detached (Det)
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7 ) Shakes (Shk)
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23 ) RV Parking (RV)
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CONTRACT

In consideration of your agreement to list the property described herein and to use
reasonable efforts to find a purchaser or tenant therefor I hereby grant you for the period
stated herein from date hereof the exclusive nght to sell lease or exchange said property
or any part thereof at the price and terms stated herein, or at such other price or terms to
which I may agree in writing
During the life of this contract, if you your agent, or any other party finds a party who is
ready able and willing to buy lease or exchange said property or any part thereof at said
price and terms or any other pnee or terms to which I may agree in writing or if said
property or any part thereof is sold leased or exchanged dunno sa^ term by myself or any
other party I agree to pay the broker listed below a fee of fc» 7A)f said sale lease or
exchange price Unless otherwise agreed in wnting the fee shall be due and payable on
the date of closing the sale lease or exchange Such fee shall be paid if property is sold,
conveyed or otherwise transferred wtthtnyCTdays after the termnabon of this contract, or
•ny extension thereof to any party to wnom the property was offered or shown by me or
you or any other party during the term of this listing^ However, I shall not be obligated to
pay such fee if a valid listing agreement is entered into dunng the term of said protection
penod with another licensed real estate broker and a sale, lease or exchange of the
properly is made dunng the term of said protection period
You are hereby authorized to accept a deposit as earnest money from any potential
buyer on the above described property Said deposit is to be held in trust account
I hereby warrant the information herein to be correct and that I have marketable title or
an otherwise established nght to sell lease or exchange said property, except as stated I
agree to execute the necessary documentsof conveyance or lease and to prorate general
This contract is entered into this

7V7
fe>

„
. uof« , / f(JCS£-)S
>//i/
day

* J t / £ - £

Member of Multiple Listing Service Board of REALTORS^
taxes insurance rents interest and other expenses affecting said property to agreed date
of possession and to furnish a good and marketable title with abstract to date or at my
option a policy of title insurance in the amount of the purchase price and in the name of the
purchaser In the event of sale or lease of other than real property I agree to provide
proper conveyance and acceptable evidence of title or right to sell lease or exchange
In case of the employment of an attorney to enforce any of the terms of this agreement I
agree to pay a reasonable attorney s fee and all costs of collection
You are hereby authorized to obtain financial information from any mortgagee or other
party holding a lien or interest on this property You are hereby authorized and instructed to
offer this property through the Multiple Listing Service of the Board of REALTORS" to
which you belong
You are hereby authorized to place an appropriate sign on said property
You are hereby authorized and instructed to have a key box installed on my property as
described above As owner I accept the full responsibility for any loss or damage that
might result from the use of the key box from any source whatsoever and agree to hold you
and the Board of REALTORS« to which you belong and its Multiple Listing Service harm
less from any and all liability as a result of having the key box installed on my property
The fees payable for the sale lease or management of property are not set by any Board
of REALTORS* or Multiple Listing Service or in any manner o'ber than between the
broker and the client
The parties hereto agree not to discriminate against any person or persons based on
race color religion sex or national origin in connection with the sale lease or exchange of
properties under this agreement m
*nj

. 19_**$*> 1_ This contract expireakprVthe

^

1 ^-day of

Owner Signature > ^ C T V ^ S J ^ N A ^ - Q ^ V S Q A v\ V f\_
Salesman Signature^
Owner I hereby acknowledge receipt of this agreement.
This is a legally binding loan

Owner S i g n a t u > e ^ y [ ^ ^ L ^ X ^ y Jr^ftl/Jf/^S
Owner Address
11 not understood, seek competent

legal advice

Approved

Form Board of REALTORS*1

ADDENDUM C

TRANSCRIPT OF FLOOR DEBATE
HB 281: 25 HER 1983
45 Leg., Day 47, Record No.6, Side 1, Counter No. 16.
CLERK:

House BUI 281: Penalty for Intentional Breach of Fiduciary Duty by
Representative Nolan E. Karros, being enacted by the Legislature of the State of
Utah.

KARRAS:

Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Representatives, the bill you have before you, House
Bill 281, was brought to me by the Statewide Area Prosecutors. It is a bill that
changes the penalty for a fiduciary's breach of his duty in protecting property,
mainly cash funds that are with him, or held by him in trust. The problem was
highlighted by some people, some attorneys, that were in Utah County,-in two
different instances, as I understand it, used the monies that were held in their
trust account, their client's monies-misappropriated the money and the highest
penalty they could be charged under the current law was a misdemeanor. The
prosecutors felt some frustration at that because the Bar Association wouldn't take
action against these folks unless it was a felony. What it amounts to is if you
went into Cheryl Fidel's house and stole $2,000 you'd be guilty of a felony, but
if he gave ya $2,000 in a trust account and you stole that, you would only be
guilty of a misdemeanor. Were just trying to make some similarities really in
saying that if someone does misappropriate funds as a fiduciary, someone that has
responsibility for someone else's money, that the punishment is increased. And
Mr. Speaker I'd like to divert some time to Representative Hillyard for, to help
me with the explanation.

HILLYARD-. The Code outlines some, initially referred to in the act, is a classification of
offenses under theft. And if you steal property or services exceeding $1,000, or
a firearm or an operable motor car, or if you are armed with a deadly weapon at
the time of the theft, or the property is stolen from the person of another, its a
felony of the second degree which has a minimum of five years in prison. A
felony of the third degree if the value of services is more than $250 or less than
$1,000 and if the actor has been twice before convicted of theft of property or
services valued at $250 or less. It talks about some animals. I think the real
thing this bill does is bring theft of a, by a fiduciary into the same classifications
of theft as it would be by anyone else. I would be glad to respond to any
questions you may have in that area, but I think it just makes it consistent
throughout the Code.
SPEAKER:

Is there further discussion? Representative Karras you may sum up,

KARRAS:

Thank you, I'll waive sum-up.

SPEAKER:

Voting is open, [pause] Appears to the chair that all present have voted, voting
is closed on House Bill 281 having received 59 affirmative an no negative votes
it passes this house. Referred to the Senate for their consideration.

ADDENDUM D

§ 224.13

OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY

Art. 224

§ 224.13
Misapplication of Entrusted Property and Property of Government or Financial Institution *
A person commits an offense if he applies or disposes of property that has been entrusted to him as a fiduciary, or property
of the government or of a financial institution, in a manner which
he knows is unlawful and involves substantia] risk of loss or detriment to the owner of the property or to a person for whose benefit the property was entrusted. The offense is a misdemeanor if
the amount involved exceeds $50; otherwise it is a petty misdemeanor. "Fiduciary" includes trustee, guardian, executor, administrator, receiver and any person carrying on fiduciary functions
on behalf of a corporation or other organization which is a fiduciary.
Comment f
1. Background. This section covers the mishandling of property restricted by law to particular uses, such as property held
in trust or public funds appropriated for designated purposes.
The essence of the offense is a knowing violation of the restrictions or regulations governing the handling of property. No
purpose to appropriate the property for the benefit of the actor
or another nor any purpose to deprive the owners or lawful beneficiaries of their property need be proved. The absence of
such purposes is what distinguishes this offense from embezzlement and larceny, forms of theft that are treated in the consolidated theft provisions in Section 223.2 of the Model Code.
Under Section 224.13, the actor may still be liable even though
he intends to use the property more effectively for the beneficial
owners, as where a trustee endeavors to increase the income
from a trust by investing the trust funds in high-yield speculative securities rather than in low-yield government bonds as re• History Presented to the Institute as Section 206 40 of Tentative Draft
No 2 and considered at the May 1954 meeting. See generally ALI Proceed
ings 146-52 (1954) Reprinted in Tentative Draft No 4 Presented again
to the Institute in the Proposed Official Draft and approved at the May
1962 meeting. See ALI Proceedings 226-27 (1962). Detailed commentary
was originally included in Tentative Draft No. 2 at 124-25 (1954)
t Except where otherwise noted, the abbreviated citation of statutes refers
to enactments prior to November 1, 1978 However, the subsequently enacted New Jersey statute has been included throughout As used in an abbreviated citation, the symbol (p) refers to a proposed code for the indicated
jurisdiction A full explanation of all abbreviated citations appears at p XXXIX"
supra
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quired by the deed of trust or where an army disbursing officer
diverts funds allocated for a base swimming pool to build tennis
courts instead
Such behavior was often treated as equivalent to embezzlement in laws in effect when Section 224.13 was drafted.1 It is
clear, however, that conduct of this sort is criminologicaHy distinct from fraudulent misappropriation of the funds of another.
The conduct covered here does not grow out of acquisitiveness,
with a corresponding need to increase penalties to felony levels
in proportion to the temptation to large gains. Instead, this
provision covers failure to observe carefully regulations designed
to safeguard property. Accordingly, it is at least appropriate to
reduce the level of the offense to a misdemeanor or petty misdemeanor, and a case could be made for its elimination from the
penal code entirely, relying instead on civil sanctions to keep fiduciaries from diverting funds to uses beyond their authority.8
A good case could be made as well to remove this provision
from an article dealing with various forms of fraud, in view of
the absence of fraudulent purpose that will characterize the situations to which it will apply. Properly viewed, the offense in1
E g., Mo 5 558 260 (repealed 1979) (officials who appropriate or disburse
funds for an unauthorized purpose are guilty of a felony), N M $ 41-4519
(repealed 1963) (any person in possession of another's property who disposes
of it "in any way not authorized by the owner" is guilty of embezzlement);
18 U S C §§ 641 (10 years* imprisonment for theft or disposing of government property "without authority*), 644 ("whoever
applies any
portion of public money for any purpose not prescribed by law is guilty of
embezzlement"), 646 (any clerk or officer of the court who "fails to deposit
promptly any money belonging in registry of the court" is guilty of embezzlement). But c/ Pa tit 18, § 4832 (repealed 1973) (use of tax money for
purpose other than that for which it was collected is a misdemeanor). For
relevant case law, see Golden v United States, 318 F2d 357 (1st Cir. 1963)
(conviction for misapplication of bank funds does not depend on whether
bank profits or loses from the unauthorized transaction), Dimmick v. United
States, 121 F 638 (9th Cir), cert denied, 191 US 574 (1903) (conviction of etnbezzlement for failure to deposit funds on date required by regulation).
2
The Brown Commission recommended the modification of federal law
along the lines suggested by this section and in explicit reliance on the Model Penal Code Brown Comm'n, Final Report 5 1737, 2 Brown Comm'n, Working Papers 930-32 The proposed federal code as passed by the Senate omitted such an offense, presumably leaving the matter to theft statutes and regulatory offenses US (p) S 1437, §5 1713 to 1738 (1978) A few states have
included a comparable offense under general theft statutes Ariz 9 131802(a)(2); Iowa § 714 1(2), S D § 22-30A-10.
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volves the safeguarding of property and thus could with reason
be placed in Article 220 along with criminal mischief.
2. Elements of the Offense. Section 224.13 makes it a criminal offense for a person to apply or dispose of entrusted property in a manner that he knows is unlawful and that he knows
to involve substantial risk of loss to the beneficial owner of the
property. Entrusted property is described as property entrusted
to the actor as a "fiduciary" as well as property of the government or a financial institution. The term "fiduciary" is broadly
defined in the final sentence of the section. The term "financial
institution" is defined in Section 223.0(2), and the definition is
made applicable to Article 224 offenses by Section 224.0. There
are two issues related to the scope of the section that deserve
separate treatment.
(a) Limitation of Class of Offenders. One problem is
how far to extend the criminal law in dealing with nonfraudulent misapplication of property. It seems inadvisable
to make a criminal offense out of every breach of instructions by a bailee or agent with respect to the disposition of
property in his custody. Accordingly, the principle has
been adopted, derived from a variety of laws existing when
Section 224.13 was drafted, of penalizing non-fraudulent
misapplication only in situations where the obligation of
close adherence to the limits of authority is well defined and
generally recognized, as in the case of fiduciaries and in respect of property of the government or a financial
institution.3 In these areas people generally are aware of
strict limits on the discretion of individuals to deal with
property in their control and usually will know that deviation from the rules may have substantial consequences.
There are, nevertheless, recently enacted provisions that
extend the coverage of related provisions beyond such a
narrow class of persons. The New York statute, for example, creates a general offense of misapplication of property
in the case of any person "knowingly possessing personal
3
In addition to the references in note 1 supra, see 18 U.S.C. §§656 (banker or employee who embezzles or "wilfully misapplies"). 660 (manager or
employee of common carrier who steals or "wilfully misapplies"). See also
Mass. ch. 266, § 53A (banker or employee who "wilfully misapplies"; "without authority" issues a certificate of deposit or bill of exchange; "without
authority" assigns any note or other property of the bank; knowingly accepts inadequate security or an "irresponsible" endorsement); Pa. tit. 18, §
4829 (repealed 1973) (wilful misapplication of bank property "with intent
. to injure or defraud").
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property of another pursuant to an agreement that the
same will be returned to the owner at a future time*' who
"loans, pledges, pawns or otherwise encumbers such property" without consent and in such a manner as "to create a
risk that the owner will not be able to recover it or will suffer pecuniary loss." 4 The offense is much narrower than
Section 224.13 in the sense that the covered conduct does
not reach some situations where the actor "applies or disposes of property" in a manner inconsistent with lawful restrictions. It does, however, apply to ordinary bailees and
to that extent departs substantially from the recommendations of the Model Code. The majority of recently drafted
codes and proposals have followed the Model Penal Code
formulation for the class of persons covered by this offense.5
Delaware and Connecticut have followed the more expansive definition in New York.*
(b) Culpability. Even as restricted to a narrow class of
persons, Section 224.13 does not permit criminal punishment
for every breach of property rules. It requires first that
the actor's conduct be unlawful and that it expose the property to a substantial risk of loss or detriment. The section
further requires that the actor know of the unlawfulness of
his conduct7 and that he know of the substantial risk of
loss or detriment to the beneficial owrpr of the property.11
4
N.Y. § 165.00(1). Subsection (2) provides a defense if at the time the
prosecution is begun the defendant has recovered the property and no material economic loss has resulted.

»E. g., Ala. 5 13A-9-51; Haw. 5 708-S74; Ind. 5 33-43-5-3(4); Ky. § 517.110; Me. tit. 17A, 5 903; N.H. § 638:11; N.D. § 12.1-23-07; Ore. § 165.095;
Pa. tit. 18, 5 4113; Tex. § 32.45; Utah 5 76-&-513; Mich, (p) § 4155; S.C.
(p) § 19.11; Vt. (p) § 2.22.3; W.Va. (p) § 61-8-29. See also Brown Comm'n,
Final Report 5 1737; 2 Brown Comm'n, Working Papers 931.
The recent enactment in New Jersey follows the substance of the Model
Code provision exactly, except for the addition of the words "whether or not
the actor has derived a pecuniary benefit" at the end of the first sentence of
Section 224.13. N.J.'§ 2C21-15. The thought expressed by the addition of
such language is implicit in the Model Code provision as defined, however,
and thus should not lead to a different interpretation of the two provisions
• Del. tit. 11,5 848; Conn. § 53a-129.
7
The required mens tea is knowledge of the regulations that apply to the
actor's conduct because of his fiduciary responsibilities. There is no requirement of knowledge of the criminal law or the elements of Section 224.13. See Section 2.02(9) supra.
•Section 223.0(1) defines "deprive" to include situations where the actor
disposes of property "so as to make it unlikely that the owner will recover
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It is thus only the clearest case of misapplication that is
covered. The offense is analogous to the reckless endangerment of property; it is the known substantial risk of loss or
detriment that is the gravamen of the offense.f
These culpability limitations were thought essential to
avoid the intrusion of the criminal law into a field that is
more appropriately the subject of civil treatment. They
have been accepted in a number of recently drafted codes
and proposals,10 although some have not followed the Model
Code recommendations as to all elements of the crime. A
few states only require a mental state of recklessness with
regard to the risk of loss or detriment,11 while at least one
it." The operation of this definition will sometimes make it a close question
whether conduct by a fiduciary is theft under Section 223.2 or a violation of
Section 224.13. The difference between the two offenses inheres in the degree of risk of loss involved. If it Is "unlikely" that recovery of the property will occur, by which is meant a substantial certainty, then the offense
might be theft. If there is a "substantial risk," I e.t less certainty of a loss,
then the offense might be misapplication. The line is a subtle one but there
can be no escape from having to draw it. Because of this relationship between the offenses, there is a sense in which Section 224.13 is a lesser included offense to Section 223.2.
• An earlier version of the section made the issue of risk of loss or detriment a matter of affirmative defense to be proved by the defendant and also
created certain presumptions of knowledge where the actor was a professional fiduciary or custodian of property for the government or a financial
institution. See MPC § 206.40, T.D. 2, at 123-24 (1954). This was changed
largely out of a sense that the section should be simplified and that the burden of proof should be shifted only when clearly necessary.
»•£. g., Ala. § 13A-9-51; Haw. 5 708-374; Ky. 9 517.110; Ind. § 3543-5-3(4); N.J. 9 2C:21-15; N.D. 9 12.1-23-07; Ore. 9 165.095; Pa. tit. 18,
9 4113; Mich, (p) 9 4155; S.C. (p) 9 19.11; W.Va. (p) 9 61-8-29.
"Conn. 9 53a-129; Dei. tit. 11, 9 848; N.Y. 9 165.00; Utah 9 76-7-513;
Vt (p) 9 2.22.3. The culpability required under the Maine and New Hampshire statutes is not clear. The statutes read:
in a manner which he knows is a violation of his duty and which involves substantial risk of loss.
Me. tit. 17A, 9 903; N.H. 9 638:11. As worded, "knows" applies only to the
violation, not to the substantial risk. New Hampshire follows the Model
Code by providing in its general culpability sections that:
When the law defining an offense prescribes the kind of culpability that
is sufficient for its commission, without distinguishing among the material elements thereof, such culpability shall apply to all the material elements, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears.
N.H. 9 626:2(1). Maine has a virtually identical provision. Me. tit. 17A, §
11(2). The ambiguity nonetheless remains.

362

Art. 224

EXECUTION OF DOCUMENTS

§ 224.14

allows conviction based on a mens rea of recklessness for all
elements of the crime.13. Grading. The second sentence of the section grades the
offense as a misdemeanor if more than $50 is involved and otherwise as a petty misdemeanor. Given the distinction between
this offense and the misappropriation of property covered by the
theft offenses, it is clear that there is no case for higher sanctions. Misdemeanor penalties have been accepted as appropriate
by virtually all recently drafted provisions," although only
Pennsylvania has accepted the division recommended by the
Model Code between the misdemeanor and the petty misdemeanor level.14 Delaware and Texas have graded this offense as a
felony if the property involved exceeds a certain amount.1'* The
recent enactment in New Jersey adopts a three-level grading
scheme with a 10-year maximum for the most serious offense.1"
§ 224.14
Securing Execution of Documents by Deception *
A person commits a misdemeanor if by deception he causes
another to execute any instrument affecting, purporting to affect,
or likely to affect the pecuniary interest of any person.
" Tex. § 32.45.

13 E. g.f Ala. $ 13A-9-51; Conn. 5 53a-129; Haw. $ 708-874; Ind. 5 3343-5-3(4); Ky. § 517.110; Me. tit. I7A, § 903; NH 5 63811; N.Y. 5 165.00;
N.D. $ 12.1-23-07; Ore. 5 165.095; Pa. tit. 18, 5 4113. Utah 5 76-&-513; Mich
(p) 5 4155; W. Va. (p) 5 61-8-29.
»*Pa. tit. 18, 54113.
is Del. tit 11, § 848 ($300); Tex. * 32.45 (a felony of the third degree if
the amount exceeds $200, and a felony of the second degree if the amount
exceeds $10,000) The proposed Vermont criminal code grades the offense
as a felony regardless of amount Vt. (p) $ 2 22.3
•* N.J. 5 2C.21-15. The details of the grading structure are refir -.' »n
Section 224.8 Comment 5 notes 16-18 supra. Since the grading divisions
are expressed in terms of the benefit derived by the actor, this departure
from the Model Code perhaps explains the addition of the language quoted
in note 5 supra to the New Jersey offense Without such language, the negative implications of the grading structure might have led to unwarranted
restriction of the scope of the offense.
* History. Presented to the Institute as Section 206 20 of Tentative Draft
No. 2 and considered at the May 1954 meeting. See ALI Proceedings 195-97
(1954). Reprinted in Tentative Draft No. 4 Presented again to the Institute
in the Proposed Official Draft and approved at the May 1962 meeting. See
ALI Proceedings 226-27 (1962). Detailed commentary was originally included in Tentative Draft No. 2 at 113-14 (1954).
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Instruction No. 8
Reasonable doubt
The burden is upon the prosecution to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an absolute certainty. A
reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason, and one which is reasonable in view of all the
evidence. It must be reasonable doubt and not a doubt which is merely fanciful or imaginary
or based on wholly speculative possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of
proof which satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding of those who are bound to act
conscientiously upon it and prevents all reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt
which reasonable men and women would entertain, and it must arise from the evidence or
the lack of evidence in this case.

<2<n

Instruction No. 9
Elements of the offense
Before you may find Defendant Kimberlee Winward guilty of Unlawful Dealing with
Property by Fiduciary, as charged in the Information, the state must prove and you must find
and believe, beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every one of the following elements:
1.

That the defendant was entrusted with property as a Fiduciary for George and
Marie Bauer;

2.

That the defendant violated her duty to the Bauers;

3.

That the defendant knew that her conduct was in violation of her duty;

4.

That said breach of duty involved an actual or a substantial risk of loss or
detriment to the Bauers exceeding $1,000; and

5.

That the defendant's violation, if any, occurred in Iron County, Utah on or
about August 9, 1993.

If the State of Utah has failed to prove any one or more of the previously described
elements, you must find the defendant not guilty of the offense charged. However, if the
state has proved each and every one of the foregoing elements to your satisfaction and
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty of Unlawful Dealing of
Property by Fiduciary, as charged in the Information.

Cv <v"

Instruction No. 10

In these instructions certain words and phrases J/are used which require definitions in
order that you may properly understand the nature of the crime charged and in order that you
may properly apply the law as contained in these instructions to the facts as you may find
them farm the evidence. These definitions are as follows:
A person engages in conduct "knowingly", or with "knowledge", with respect to her
conduct or to circumstances surrounding her conduct when she is aware of the nature of her
conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts "knowingly", or with "knowledge",
with respect to a result of her conduct when she is aware that her conduct is reasonably
certain to cause the result.
"Property" means anything of value, including real estate, written instruments or
other writings representing or embodying rights concerning real or personal property.
You are instructed that "fiduciary" includes anyone who acts for another in a
relationship implying and necessitating great confidence and trust. The term is not restricted
to trustees, but also includes relationships such as agent or broker.
"Fiduciary duty" is a duty to act for someone else's benefit, while subordinating one's
personal interests to that of the other person. It is the highest standard of duty implied by
law.
To "entrust" or "entrusted" means to give over to another something after a relation
of competence has been established. To deliver to another something in trust or to commit
something to another with a certain competence regarding his care, use or disposal of it.

Instruction No. 11
A principal broker, and real estate agent acting on hisbehalf, who acts solely on
behalf of the seller owe the seller the following fiduciary duties:
(a) Loyalty, which obligates the agent to act in the best interest of the seller instead
of all other interests, including the agent's own interest;
(b) Obedience, which obligates the agent to obey all lawful instructions from the
seller;
(c) Full disclosure, which obligates the agent to tell the seller all material information
which the agent learns about the buyer or about the transaction;
(d) Fidelity, which obligates the agent to act only for the seller, and not the buyer,
unless consent to representation of both is given after full disclosure.

INSTRUCTION NO.

H

When you retire to consider your verdict, you will select one of your fellow jurors to act
as foreperson, who, as foreperson, will preside over your deliberations and who will sign the
verdict to which you agree. Your verdicts in-this case must be as follows:
1.

We, the jury duly empaneled in the above-entitled case, find Defendant
KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD GUILTY of the offense of Unlawful Dealing with
Property by a Fiduciary, as charged in the Information;
OR

2.

We, the jury duly empaneled in the above-entitled case, find Defendant
KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD NOT GUILTY of the offense of Unlawful Dealing
with Property by a Fiduciary, as the offense is unproven by the burden of evidence
required;

This being a criminal case, unanimous concurrence of jurors is required to find a verdict.
A written form for each of the above-mentioned possible verdicts will be furnished to you. When
your verdict has been found, the appropnate spaces must be marked, the form signed and dated
by your foreperson, and then returned by you to the Court. When your verdict has been found,
notify the bailiff that you are ready to report to the Court.
DATED this 2 ^ ? day of November, 1994.

LYUE/R. ANDERSON
District Court Judge
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ADDENDUM F

ShJu&telDtet Court *ifon County

F I L E D
MAY 2 7H99A

SCOTT M.BURNS (#4283)
Iron County Attorney
97 North Main, Suite #1
P.O. Box 428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-6694

2(tL

_ _ CLERK
DEPUTY

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR IRON L J U N T Y , STATE OF UTAH
)

STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff,
v$.

)

EMER KENT WINWARD and
KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD,

)

STATES OBJECTION TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
DISQUALIFY SCOTT M. BURNS

Criminal Nos. 941500056
941500057

)

Defendants.

Judge James L. Shumate

COMES NOW the State of Utah, by and through Iron County Attorney Scott M. Burns,
and respectfully objects to the Defendants' Motion to Disqualify Scott M. Burns from further
prosecution of the above-entitled matter.
The State's objection is made on the grounds that the Defendants have failed to set forth
any statutory basis, ethical reason, or a legally sufficient basis upon which to disqualify the Iron
County Attorney. The State respectfully responds to the specific allegations set forth in the
Defendants' Motion to Disqualify as follows, to wit:
ALLEGATIONS
ALLEGATION NO. 1. At the outset, Mr. Burns perjured himself in the statement of
probable cause which he signed in order to obtain arrest warrants for the Defendant and his wife
falsely stating that:

IOW

a.

The Defendants "were the real estate agent and attorney representing the

interests of George and Ann Bauer . . . " (Probable Cause Statement f5)
b.

''Defendant Kimberlee H. Winward became the selling agent and originally

advised the Bauers to list the property for sale in the amount of $45,000." (Probable Cause
Statement %l)
c+

"Thereafter, Kimberlee H. Winward advised Mr. and Mrs. Bauer to accept

a cash offer in the amount of $40,000 from one Nicole Packer." (Probable Cause Statement f l )
d.

[D]uring an interview with Detective Orton on January 5,1994, Defendant

Emer Kent Winward acknowledged . . . that his wife had full knowledge of said action (the
alleged forgery) and consented, agreed, and assisted in that taking place." (Probable Cause
Statement %3)
Each of these allegations is central to the State's theories of criminal liability. Each of
these statements is false and unsupported by any evidence.
Furthermore, and more disturbingly, the police report does not support any of these
allegations which indicates that Mr. Burns made them right out of whole cloth. Most telling is
the fact that Detective Orton's account of the January 5 interview with Kent Winward indicates
that Mr. Winward told the investigator that the subject check was deposited into Mrs. Winward's
account "to expedite the process in which Nicole would receive her percentage of the profit."
The investigator's account is completely devoid of any allegation made by Kent Winward
regarding his wife's knowledge of the process by which the subject check was endorsed or
deposited.
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RESPONSE NO. lfaV Detective Kelvin Orton of the Cedar City Police Department
submitted a report to the Iron County Attorney's Office (seg Exhibit "A", attached hereto and
incorporated herein, and hereinafter referred to as "Detective Orton's report") that contained an
interview with Nicole Packer on December 10, 1993 (relating to the sale of the George and Ann
Marie Bauer home) which states, "Kim and Kent Winward needed Nicole Packer as a partner to
list as the original buyer for appearances." Moreover, Detective Orton's report contains an
interview with Mitch Schoppmann, Cedar Land and Title, on January 4, 1994, that quotes
Schoppmann as saying, "The property located at 171 North 800 West was bought and sold in
basically the same transaction." Mr. Schoppmann further stated that "according to Cedar Land
and Title personnel, Kent Winward handled the paperwork concerning this real estate transaction
including closing."
Clearly, the prosecutor preparing a probable cause statement would be led to believe that
Mr. and Mrs. Winward were acting on behalf of George and Ann Marie Bauer as related to the
sale of the subject property.
RESPONSE NO. Kb) and KcV Detective Orton's report sets forth an interview with Mr.
Tom Goodman, ERA Realty, on January 10, 1994, wherein Mr. Goodman stated "he did not
handle the actual sale of the property and was just the listing agent. Kim Winward (also of ERA
Realty) was the 'selling agent' and handled all negotiations with the buyer." Goodman also stated
to Detective Orton that "all the information regarding the sale of the property would have come
through Kim Winward."
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In an interview with George Bauer on January 10, 1994, Mr. Bauer informed Detective
Orton that "they originally were advised to list the property for $45,000 . . . they received an
offer of $40,000 cash which they eventually agreed to."
In that Mr. Goodman and Defendant Kimberlee H. Winward both worked for ERA Realty,
and based upon Detective Orton's report that Mr. Goodman asserted "he was just the listing
agent" and "Kim Winward was the selling agent and all of the negotiations came through her,"
a prosecutor preparing the probable cause statement would be led to believe that Defendant
Kimberlee H. Winward (the selling agent) would have been the person to advise on the sale
amount ($45,000) and would have been the person to advise Mr. and Mrs. Bauer to sell for
$40,000."
RESPONSE NO. KdV Detective Orton informed the Iron County Attorney, verbally,
while the Iron County Attorney was preparing the probable cause statement, that Defendant Kent
Winward stated that Defendant Kim Winward knew Defendant Kent Winward was going to sign
Nicole Packer's name to the subject check (which is alleged to have been forged), and she further
knew that Defendant Kent Winward was going to deposit the check into her (Defendant Kim
Winward's checking account). The State alleges that this assertion was also based upon (and the
Court agreed in its findings as set forth in the preliminary hearing transcript, p. 262) the fact that
Defendant Kimberlee H. Winward made her checking account available to Defendant E. Kent
Winward and then wrote funds out of that account, specifically the $1,160 check to Ms. Packer.
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The State asserts, by the Defendants' failure to challenge or argue, that all other
allegations contained in the probable cause statement were true and based upon appropriate
evidence. Finally, the State asserts that a "probable cause statement" is made by prosecuting
attorneys in support of a information and arrest warrant and is just that, a statement that
"probable cause" exists to support the alleged offenses. Clearly, if the State were held to only
setting forth completely unrefutable assertions in the probable cause statement, there would be
no need for (a) a preliminary hearing or (b) a trial, and upon submission of the probable cause
statement, all parties could simply move to the sentencing phase.
ALLEGATION NO. 2. During the noon recess of the preliminary hearing, Mr. Bums
accosted defense counsel in the halls of the courthouse and invited defense counsel to set (sic)
outside, apparently for the purpose of some physical altercation.
RESPONSE NO. 2. The State of Utah asserts that Iron County Attorney Scott M. Bums
did not accost defense counsel in the halls of the courthouse and did not invite counsel outside
for the purpose of some physical altercation. If the Court is interested in the particulars of those
allegations, please refer to Exhibit "B", attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference.
ALLEGATION NO. 3. When challenged regarding the inaccuracy of the probable cause
statement and his behavior at the preliminary hearing, Mr. Bums responded with name-calling
and more false accusations.
RESPONSE NO. 3. Again, the State of Utah asserts that Iron County Attorney Scott M.
Bums did not engage in any engage in any "name-calling" or "false accusations" at the
preliminary hearing. The Court is again directed to review State's Exhibit "B" which is attached
hereto.
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ALLEGATION NO. 4. Mr. Burns' comments to the press have been unethical and
inappropriate.
RESPONSE NO. 4. The State denies that Iron County Attorney Scott M. Burns has made
any comments to the press that have been unethical and inappropriate. In fact, the Iron County
Attorney was misquoted by a Daily Spectrum newspaper reporter, and upon reading the article,
the Iron County Attorney responded in what would appear to be the appropriate and professional
manner (see Exhibit "C", attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference).
ALLEGATION NO. 5. Mr. Burns1 conduct of the prosecution of this matter evidences
an irrational and unjustifiable animus toward the Defendants.
RESPONSE NO. 5. The Iron County Attorney received information that certain citizens
had made complaints that Defendants Emer Kent Winward and Kimberlee H. Winward had
committed criminal offenses. Thereafter, Cedar City Police Detective Kelvin Orton investigated
the case, presented Mr. Burns with a police report, and the case was screened by Detective Orton
and the Iron County Attorney. Thereafter, a criminal information and probable cause statement
were prepared, and the Defendants were charged with felony counts, have received all of their
constitutional rights and protections to date, and were bound over after a preliminary hearing.
If the foregoing is "unjustifiable animus" toward the Defendants, I suppose one could argue that
anytime the State's prosecutor files charges against certain defendants and prosecutes the case
pursuant to the laws of the State of Utah, there is "unjustifiable animus." In any event, the State
of Utah denies any bias, prejudice, or ulterior motives related to the prosecution of this case.
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Based upon the foregoing, the State of Utah asserts that the Iron County Attorney should
not be removed from the prosecution of this case.
DATED this

2-3~

day of May, 1994.

SCOTT M. BURNS
Iron County Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true, and correct copy of the within and
foregoing STATE'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISQUALIFY SCOTT M.
BURNS, by first-class mail, postage fully prepaid, on this
following, to wit:
Mr. Gary W Pendleton, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant
150 North 200 East, Suite 202
St. George, UT 84770

Secretary
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day of May, 1994, to the

Cedar City Police Department
Incident File
ncident Number: 93-8267
Nature of Incident: Foraery
tfense Code: FUR6 Incident Address: 26 N M a m
(Time Spent: 30
City Cedar City
State: UT
ZIP: 64720
Contact Person:
omplainant:
< Name Number: 29900
First: Nicole
ast: Packer
Middle:
Address 840 S Main « 316
Phone tt: (801)865-0662
ZIP: fi4720
Cedar City
ST UT
City
DOB: 12/30/74
Received By
7
ocation Code
K Orton
Responding Officer
P
ow Received?
K Orton
Responsible Officer K Orton
qency Code
CCPD
Time Occurred
12/10/93
ate Occurred
13:25
Time Reported
15/10/93
ate Reported
13:00
Time Arrived
13:00
irue D i s p a t c h e r
13:00
Disposition Code
13:30
CAA
ime Completed
Miscellaneous Entry Ko
01/21/94
ate Disp Declared
The complainant alleges forgery to a check issued b>' Crdar Land & Title.
The cheer wac endorsed and deposited into the suspect is; account at
Mountain America. The payee listed on tne check is Nicole Packer.
No included Offenses for this incident.

/oe
ssrsr

w

M
4rl
W

m
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«

m
M

m
m
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INVGi-VI NG
Date
Record tt
.t-.».-r.=:.>
29900
12/10/93
12/10/93
30336
12/10/93
£6414
97
IE/10/93
38337
12/10/93
760
1E/1B/93
12/10/93
30336
12/10/93
17460
12/10/93
1&K93
30330
1L/10/93
12/10/93
10093
17460
12/10/93
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Description

Fv'elationship

nr = sr^=r=ru= = = = = = = =:^=r:=^rr=:

Packer, Nicole
Schoppmann, Mitchell
Goodsell, Garry
Orton, Kelvin
Williams, Patricia
tauer, George
Bauer, Ann
Winward, Kimberlee
W m w a r d , tmer
Goodman, 1 homas
Winward, Emer
Uinward, Kimberlee

complainant
Involved Party
Involved Party
Investigator
Invo1ved Party
Victim
Vietam
Suspect
ousoect
In V O J v e d Par t v

Arrestee
Arrestee

"i i t i a 1 Information:
On 12/10/93 at 1300 hrs I was contacted by Nicole Packer who
jvised that she had been partners in a real estate transaction
ith Kim and Kent Winward which involved buying a property and
filing the same property to another buyer for a substantial
rofit. Kim Winward explained that the property being purchased
as located at 171 N 600 W CDC and was presently owned by George
nd Ann Marie Bauer, the property would then be sold to another
uyer Vicky and Dan Bassett the day the purchase from Bauer
losed.
Kim Winward told Packer that the transaction would not look
thical if Kim Winward was represented as the buyer and then sold
he property to another buyer for profit. Kim Winward is an
gent for ERA Realty representing George Bauer, therefore, Kim
nd Kent Winward needed Nicole Packer as a partner to list as the
riginal buyer for appearances. Winward advised Packer that the
rofits would be split into thirds, each of them taking a equal
hare.
nterview: Mitch

Schoppm&nn

On 1/4/94 this investigator met with Schoppmann who advised
;he property loccnted at 171 N 600 W was bought and then scld in
basically the same transaction. According to Schoppmann the
locuments indicate that Nicole Packer purchased the property for
>40,000.00 and then sold the property the same day for $56,000.00
;o Dan fi\Vicky Bassett. The money for the transaction was beinq
supplied by Patricia Williams of Las Vegas Nevada. The buyer
Nicole Packer then turned her interest over to Patricia Williams
flaking Patricia Williams the principal holder of the property
trust deed. Dan & Vicky Bassett would then make payments through
~edar Land & Title to Patricia Williams at a 13# interest for the
purchase of the property.
According to Cedar Land & Title personnel, Kent Winward
Dandled the paperwork concerning this real estate transaction
inc1uding closiny.
fts a result of this meeting it was found that Kim Winward
would have collected a commission check for the George Bauer &
Nicole Parker transaction as well as a share in the profit.
Interview: Emer Kent Winward
On 61/05/94 thrs investigator met with Mr.Winward who
spontaneously told this investigator he had forged Nicole
backer's name to the check $4697.50 issued by Cedar Land & Title
<\n6 deposited into his wife's account. Kent Winward states heendorsed Nicole's name to the -check and deposited the check into
Kim's account to expedite the process in which Nicole would
receive her percentage of the profit.
Kent Winward states that the profit Agreement between the
involved parties was that Nicole Packer would receive a total of
$2,000.00. $1,000.00 when the deal closed and then ^n additional
*;i,000.68 when the Winward's collected tne down payment frrm
Vicky Bassett.
Q ^T~
•*••*

i.H v^-.wr!
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>» • c..^~ <•• T-'<.\c'ri.'c>r ha;s. /:. saf.ecJ *'im

however, the Winward's concurred with the behavior at that time.
Mr. Winward has supplied this investigator with duplicate checks
which he believes to be forgeries. The documents Mr. Winward
supplied this investigator will accompany this report.
Interview: George Bauer / Ann Marie Bauer
On 1/10/94 this investigator contacted George Bauer and his
wife Ann Marie Bauer in Henderson Nevada, they state the property
located at 171 N 800 U was originally listed at $45,000.00
through ERA Realty, the asking price was lowered to $43,000.00
after the property had been on the market for approximately one
(1) yeATm The Bauer's state they received an offer of $40,000.00
cash which they considered and eventually agreed to. George Bauer
told this investigator that he did not feel comfortable with this
transaction from the start, stating "it was as though someone was
trying to buy low and then sell for a greater profit 0 this
statement was uttered prior to this investigator informing the
Bauer's of the investigation.
The Bauer' *, state that the proposal was for $40,000.00 cash
&nd their information was that the money was being wired to
Xicole Packer from her parents for the purchase of the property.
Mr. Bauer states there was no mention of the property being sold
to anyone else other then Nicole Packer or that the property was
being re-sold for an amount greater then 40,000.00
Ann Marie Bauer reiterates that the sell of the property
kas suspicious, especially to George, however, they decided to go
forward Vith the sell due to circumstance in their personal life.
The Bauer's were not familiar with Kim Winward and advised
this investigator that Tom & Milba Goodman were the listing
agents, however, the Bauer's felt positive the Goodman's were
lot involved in the deceit that took place.
Interview: Tom Goodman
On 01/10/94 I contacted Tom Goodman in reference to my
ronversation with the Bauer's. Goodman states that he did not
candle the actual sell of the property and was just the listing
\gent through ERA Realty. This investigator was informed that
vim Winward was the selling agent and handled all the
negotiations with the buyer. Goodman told this investigator all
;he information regarding the sell of the property would have
rame through Kim Winward. Goodman was not aw;are the property had
>een re-sold in the^same transaction until after the fact and
>ven then was >/GTy surprised.
Through my conversation with Goodman I found the commission
3r the sell was split into third's, one part going to the
.-anchise, one part tt« Goodman, and one part to Winward.
Goodman'?- v eccl'lection of the transaction was vague but did
a/ what information he relayed to the Bauer's would have came
roar. Kim Winward.
nterview: Garry Goodsell

Q W

On tfl/lP/94 this investigator contacted Garry GoodseDl in

Goodseil researched the transaction and found that Patricia
Llliams had sold a property located in Fiddlers Canyon, Cdcf
lit #1 lot 2, Block 5, to Berry & Teresa Gracely. When Gracely's
btain financing for the property a check was issued to Patricia
illiams in the amount of approximately $68,900.00 this check was
ent to Southern Utah Title who would forward the check to
illiams. Patricia Williams endorsed the check back to Southern
bah Title with the following instructions, $45,000.00 be sent to
edar Land & Title in the form of a Trust Deed in the name of
icole Packer with Patricia Williams as the principal interest
older. The remaining balance would be issued back to Patricia
illiams in the form of a check which was $23,242.72.
To Garry Goodseil1s knowledge this was the extent of
outhern Utah Title's involvement.
ountain America:
On 01/12/94 this investigator contacted Tonya, at Mountain
nerica Credit Union. I was advised that deposit ships were kept
n microfiche in Salt Lake City and would be available by
ubpoena.
ollow-Up Investigation:
»ate: 01/21/94
detective: Ko
On 81/21/94 This investigator contacted Sally Melling at
ledar Land & Title who discovered another possible fraud and
Forgery pertaining to an earnest money sales agreement handled
„hvougl. Cedar Land & Title and involved Kim Uinward. Mrs. Melling
^ecogni7ed the writing on the legal document as Kim Winward's.
The document shows Dan and Vicky Bassett supplying *100.08
earnest money to ERA Realty and provides a buyer's signature,
signed by Dan Bassett. The Seller's signature represents Nicole
-'acker, however, the signature is an obvious forgery based on the
actual signature of Nicole Packer. The Dan Bassett signature
list's a signing date of 07/25/93. The Nicole Packer signature
(Forger/) list's a signing uate of 07/26/93. The date of document
receipt with Da- bassett's signature is 07/15/93.
Contact with ERA Realty:
Sally Melling contacted ERA Realty and talked with agent Tom
Gc,odn«<.;v., Gcooma;» «uvi*=ed lhat the only transaction Ef;A was
involved with wa*> the Sell to Nicole Packer, the first
transaction. The second trav.»action between Packer and Bassett
was handled independently.
On 01/21/94 this investigator contacted E.RA "sealty and
talked with Lori Cood»ell who advised that ERA had no record of
•receiving earnest money pertaining to Packer and Bassett.
Goodseil explains thai usually the acer.t signs the earnest
money agreement adjacent to the "Bfak&rage" line listed as
••Received by". In the -..ase cf ti*is document there is written in
the provided line Mtc« be deposited upon closing'1.
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>J 1.0 NDRTH^MAIN V586.-99B4 :
CEDAR : C n x UT

84720 */*

STATE BANK or souTHeRN.uTAh
C«dar C&y Office
P.O.* Box 3*0
Ofr Oty, Utah 647214340.

FOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN DOLLARS AND 50/100*

^^S^T* 3

DATE

r

n

Aug. 9.199>>

AMOUNT

$ 4697.50

Nicole Packer
L

_J

E: OETACH THIS STATEMENT BEFORE DEPOSITING CHECK

^^lNccc^•lArirr^
CEDAR UNO TITLE, INC.
CLOSING T R U S T

11090
uyer: Vickie R. Bassett
?ller: Nicole Packer
Z525.00 Sellers Proceeds
2172.50 Refund of overpayment in wire transfer

NON NEGOTIABLE
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IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY
97 North Main, Suite #1 • P.O. Box 428 • Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-6694 Telecopier: (801) 586-2737
SCOTT M. BURNS, COUNTY ATTORNEY

KYLE D. LATIMER, CHIEF DEPUTY

May 27, 1994

The Honorable Jan Graham
Utah Attorney General
236 State Capitol Bldg.
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
RE:

State v. Winward Fifth District Court Criminal No. 941500056
Attorney Gary W. Pendleton

Dear General Graham:
Mr. Gary W. Pendleton previously requested that you remove me from this case (see
Exhibit "A") and I responded (see Exhibit "B"); he now makes a similar request (see Exhibit "C")
and has also filed a Motion for Change of Judge (see Exhibit "D"). Mr. Pendleton's accusations
were also forwarded to the Utah State Bar and have been dismissed as Mr. Pendleton refused to
submit the same in authorized form within the required time frame.
Mr. Pendleton is a fine lawyer and is aggressively defending his clients. I believe,
however, that Mr. Pendleton has used questionable tactics in this case (accusing me of perjury
in a probable cause statement and alleging I threatened him physically) and is currently seeking
my removal as another ploy to intimidate the prosecution and move the focus away from the
central issue, to wit: the guilt or innocence of his clients.
Please know that it is my desire to prosecute this case through jury trial (scheduled for
July 26 through July 29, 1994); if Mr. Pendleton's clients are acquitted, I am certain he will cease
in his various complaints to your office and other governmental entities.
Respectfully,

Scott M. Burns
Iron County Attorney
SMBxm
Attachments
pc: Gary W. Pendleton, Esq.

GARY W. PENDLETON
ATTORNEY AT LAW
ISO North 200 East, Suite 202, St. George, Utah 64770
Telephone (801)628-4411
Fax Number (801) 628-9260

February 22,1994

E/fi/B/r ''A"
Scott M. Burns
Iron County Attorney
97 North Main, Suite 1
P. O. Box 428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Re: State v. Winward
Dear Mr. Burns:
I believe that your conduct in this case disqualifies you from its further prosecution. I refer
to two incidents, both of which I believe you are well aware: False statements set out in the
affidavit in support of the issuance of the arrest warrant and, more significantly, your
conduct in the lobby at the Cedar City Hall of Justice.
While I can overlook some of the inaccuracies in the affidavit which you authored and
signed, given the theory of the State's case, I cannot lightly dismiss the allegation regarding
Mr. Winward's alleged legal representation of Mr. and Mrs. Bauer. The inclusion of this
material in the affidavit is at least evidence of a conscious disregard for the truth.
However, more importantly, I refer to your conduct during the noon recess on Friday,
February 18,1994. As counsel for one who is accused of a criminal offense, I have not only
therightbut the duty to represent that client zealously within the bounds of the law and the
cannons of ethics. I am free to do so without the prospect of being accosted in the halls of
the courthouse by the state's attorney and invited outside, apparently for the purpose of
some physical altercation.
I could dismiss the incident if I were to regard you as nothing more than a bully with a law
degree. However, you are more than that You represent the power and authority of the
State of Utah when you prosecute criminal cases. Accordingly, I cannot in good conscience,
as a member of this Bar, allow the State to make such an assault upon what I view as my
clients' constitutional right to due process of law and their right to be represented by
counsel.
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February 22, 1994
Page Two
I am therefore requesting that you immediately request the assistance of the Attorney
GeneraTs office in the prosecution of this case. Furthermore, I am sending them a copy of
this letter, given their supervisory authority over county attorneys pursuant to U.CA. 67-51(5).
Finally, I am sending a copy of this letter to Bar Counsel for his consideration and review.
Sincerely,

Gary W. Pendleton
GWP:cch
cc:
Kent and Kimberlee Winward
Jan Graham, Utah Attorney General
Stephen Trost
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IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY
97 North Main, Suite #1 • P.O. Box 428 • Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-6694 Telecopier: (801) 586-2737
SCOTT M. BURNS, COUNTY ATTORNEY

KYLE D. LATIMER, CHIEF DEPUTY

March 1, 1994

EXffierr

"3"

Mr. Gary W. Pendleton, Esq.
Attorney at Law
150 North 200 East, Suite 202
St. George, UT 84770
RE:

State of Utah vs. Emer Kent Winward and Kimberlee H. Winward
Fifth Judicial District Court, Criminal Nos. 941500056 and 941500057

Dear Mr. Pendleton:
Given your highly emotional demeanor at the preliminary hearing in the above-referenced
case, I can understand your frustration in having to accept the fact that both of your clients were
bound over on two (2) second-degree felonies. I cannot understand your attempt to involve the
Utah Attorney General or Bar Counsel.
As you will recall, the Court ordered you on several occasions to "move back away" from
the State!s witnesses. Moreover, I, during a late afternoon break prior to closing arguments, told
you that (a) I didn't appreciate your attempts to intimidate witnesses, (b) I couldn't believe that
you would engage in "snickering and laughing" loudly during the State's presentation of evidence,
and (c) your actions were embarrassing to me as a member of the Bar and that I had lost a great
deal of respect for you. As you will also recall, your clients and their family members gathered
around during our discussion, and I inquired as to whether or not you would like to step outside.
I find it almost humorous that you would interpret that request as a threat to harm you physically.
Mr. Pendleton, I believe in the judicial system and do my best to effectuate justice. As
a county attorney, I do not "win or lose cases" and I find no joy in prosecuting a case that alleges
a young lawyer and a young realtor committed serious felonies. That said, you must know that
I take great offense when a lawyer attempts to intimidate or ridicule witnesses who have been
subpoenaed to testify.- Many of those witnesses (as well as other persons present during court
that day) called me or came to my office after the hearing and described you as a "rabid dog,"
a "jerk," a "bully," and an "actor trying to take over the courtroom."
In that I had never dealt with you in court before, I believed that you were a fine lawyer
and a gentleman. I have since learned that your reputation for in-court sarcastic antics and
intimidation of witnesses is well-known by prosecutors and other members of the Bar in southern
Utah. I would only hope that in future proceedings regarding the above-referenced case, and

8fc>

Mr. Gary W. Pendleton, Esq.
March 1, 1994
Page 2

other dealings we may have together, we may treat each other with respect and act as
professionals while representing our respective interests.
If your letter was an attempt to open an investigation, I welcome any inquiries. If your
letter was an attempt to have me removed from prosecuting this case, I decline. If your letter
was an attempt to embarrass both of us by your whining, I am afraid you have succeeded.
Sincerely,

Scott M. Burns
Iron County Attorney
SMB:cm
Attachment
pc:

Jan Graham, Utah Attorney General
Stephen Trost

P.S. While we are addressing each other's ethics and competency, I would suggest you
consider a letter from my good friend Loni F. DeLand that I have attached hereto. Judge Eves
and Judge Braithwaite have instructed lawyers in the Fifth District (private and appointed) to
consider Mr. DeLandfs concerns. I hope you will take the appropriate steps to protect your
clients1 interests.

S5~

UTAH ASSOCIATION OF
CRIMINAL D E F E N S E LAWYERS
PA. BOX S1Q64*
SAUT LAKE CITY, UTAH 64181-0646

January 12, 1994

Honorable Robert T. Braithvaite
Fifth District court
40 North 100 East
Cedar'*City, UT 84720
SUBJECT:

Conflicts of Interest Claims Regarding Multiple
Defendant Representation

Dear Judge Braithvaite,
It has come to the attention of the officers of this
organisation that a number of appointed defense attorneys in courtB
other than the Wasatch Front courts are being required to represent
multiple defendants in criminal prosecutions.
Those defense
counsel that have raised concerns about this practice generally
cite the budgetary concerns of the various counties as being the
primary reason for multiple defendant appointments.
We - are also aware that criminal defendants are becoming
increasingly litigious in the appeal and writ processes around the
country in raising issues of ineffective assistance of counsel
under a variety of claims. One of the areas in which convicted
defendants are increasingly bringing ineffective assistance claims
is in the case of conflicts of interest arising from multiple
representation.
Although multiple representation is not a per se violation of
Sixth Amendment rights (Burger v. Kemp. 483 U.S. 776 (1987), the
U.S. supreme Court has noted that a possible conflict of interest
inheres in almost every instance- of -.multiple representation,
cuvler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980)'. Of course, multiple
attorneys from the same law firm representing more than one
defendant presents the same problem as one attorney doing the same
thing.
Hollowav v. ArkansaB. 435 U.S. 475 (1978) first enunciated
the "automatic reversal" remedy in multiple representation/conflict
of interest cases where the "possibility" of a conf iiot was brought
to the attention of the court.
Cjuylex, also* held that a defendant Who. makes a showing (of - a
potential conflict) hfifid nafi demonstrate prejudice to establish a
Sixth Amendment claim. 446 U.S. at .349-350.
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The courts will presume prejudice in cases which meet the
fiuxlfX standard.
The general standard regarding ineffective
assistance of counsel, i.e., the two-prong test set forth in
Strickland v. Washington. 446 U.S. 668 (1984), is a greater
standard than is required in conflict claims. The Strickland court
addressed the different and less vigorous test applied in conflict
cases:
In Cuyler...[ve] held that prejudice is
presumed when counsel is burdened by an actual
conflict of interest* In those circumstances,
counsel breaches the duty of loyalty, perhaps
the most basic of counsel's duties* Moreover,
it is difficult to measure the precise effect
on the' defense of representation corrupted by
conflicting interests. Given the obligation
of counsel to. avoid conflicts of interest and
the ability of trial courts to make an earlV
incruiry in certain situations likely to give
rise to conflicts.. .it is reasonable for the
criminal justice system to maintain a fairly
rigid rule of presumed prejudice for conflicts
of interest. At 692.
(EmphasiB added.)
It is no Becret that the Utah Supreme Court is dissatisfied with
the quality of appellate defense representation. Justice Kali's
present committee respecting creation of a statewide indigent
appellate defense association evidences the court's concern on the
appellate level. The court's concerns are no less significant at
the trial level,
one of the areas that is of growing concern to our courts is
some rural counties.' preference to letting contracts for indigent
defense to the lowest bidder, irrespective of the quality of the
representation. Another is this issue of multiple representation
and its potential for burdening the appeals courts with claims.
In the U.S. District Court there is an absolute prohibition
against appointment of-counsel.for ©pre .than one defendant. And,
in those rare~ cases where a' privately retained lawyer attempts to
represent more than one defendant, either personally or through a
law partner, the courts place the burden of- demonstrating a lack of
conflict (and the entry of an exprefii, informed waiver) squarely on
the defense counsel and the defendants. This problem is so closely
scrutinized that neither I, nor any of my colleagues, can even
recall an instance of multiple representation by a Utah lawyer or
law firm in the federal district court in Salt Lake.
Moreover, the appointment of counsel in the federal courts as
well as the appointment of investigators and approval for expenses
are all done sx parte pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act. Those
courts recognize, unlike many of our state courts, that anytime a
' *"- ---«•<«<«**« in aooointxnent decisions or
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decisions relating to appointment of investigators or other
reasonable and necessary defense expenses there is a clear Sixth
Amendment intrusion.
I would also invite your attention to Rule 1.7, Utah Rules or
Professional Conduct which states, intST &li&, that no lawyer
undertake any multiple representation without the consent of each
client after consultation (wherein the potential for conflict is
discussed).
Where you, as judges, make appointments at first
appearances, for multiple defendants, there has obviously been no
opportunity for consultation with the prospective lawyer, ergo,
there is a E S T £S violation of Rule 1.7.
After discussing this issue with the executive committee, I
would suggest that the only sure way to avoid a conflict is to
follow the example of the federal courts, i.e., judiciously avoid
ajm multiple appointments.
Palling adoption of the above stated policy, the second most
prudent option would be to conduct an inquiry with each indigent
defendant in a multiple defendant case wherein the potential for
conflicts are discussed and each is then required to waive any such
conflicts before the appointment can be made.
The problem remains, however, that every possible conflict
cannot be addressed early on and will frequently arise at a stage
in the proceedings when plea offers (often disparate) are made
where decisions regarding whether defendant(s) ought to testify are
necessary or when the defense lawyer is faced with trial evidence
which is objectionable to one defendant, but not to another. X
would suggest therefore, that you continue to make inquiries, on
the record, fix SfiX&s, of defendants ajui counsel concerning
potential conflicts.
As stated above, although the federal policy is the safest
option, if defendants and counsel, in multiple representation
cases, are thoroughly examined regarding conflicts and potential
conflicts at the onset and throughout the proceedings, you stand a
greater chance of stemming the growing tide of post conviction
claims of ineffective assistanoe of counsel based on conflict,
claims.

President

GARY W. PENDLETON
ATTORNEY AT LAW
S~S
((
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(801)62S-4411
Fax Number (801) 628-9260

May 17,1994
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Jan Graham
Utah Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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Re: State vs. Winward
Iron County Criminal No. 941500056
Dear Ms. Graham:
Enclosed is a copy of a motion which we have filed in the above-referenced matter seeking
the disqualification of the Iron County Attorney as prosecutor in this matter. We are
providing you with a copy of the motion because you have supervisory authority ovei; the
various county attorneys pursuant U.CA. 67-5-1(5).
We are also providing you with a courtesy copy of our statement of points and authorities
in support of our pending motion to quash the bind over order. This pleading is provided
in order to provide you a factual background against which you may evaluate the motion to
disqualify Mr. Burns.
Respec

Gary W. Pendletbn
GWPrdap
Enclosures
pc: Scott M. Burns

RECEIVED MAY 1 8 1994
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GARY W. PENDLETON (2564)
Attorney for Defendants
150 North 200 East, Suite 202
St George, Utah 84770
Ph: 628-4411
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
MOTION FOR CHANGE
OF JUDGE

Plaintiff,

vs.
Case No. 941500057

KIMBERLEE H. WINWARD,
Defendant

Defendant, by and through her attorney, Gary W. Pendleton, hereby requests
that another judge be appointed for the purpose of considering Defendant's Motion to
Quash the Bind Over Order issued by the Honorable James L. Shumate. This motion is
made on the grounds and for the reasons that Judge Shumate was the committing magistrate
and it is unreasonable and unfair to the court and to the defendant to expect the court to
review the soundness of its own order.
DATED this

/ /

day of]
Gary W. Pendleton
Attorney for Defendants

^O

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that on this 17*1 day of May, 1994,1 did personally mail
a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Motion to Scott M. Burns, Iron County
Attorney, at 97 North Main, #1, Cedar City, Utah 84720.
Secretary
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IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY
97 North Main, Suite #1 • P.O. Box 428 • Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-6694 Telecopier: (801) 586-2737
SCOTT M BURNS, COUNTY ATTORNEY

KYLE D. LATIMER, CHIEF DEPUTY

February 22, 1994

Mr. Steve Law
DAILY SPECTRUM
66 Harding Avenue
Cedar City, UT 84720
RE:

State of Utah vs. Emer Kent Winward and Kimberlee H. Winward

Dear Steve:
As you know, I have tried to be very accessible and helpful to you over the past several
months with respect to your duties as a journalist for the Daily Spectrum newspaper. I have
appreciated the fact that you have always contacted me prior to quoting me in the newspaper, and
I believe that you have always represented my statements in a fair and accurate manner.
However, after leaving town Friday evening and not returning until late Monday evening, I was
somewhat dismayed to read your article of February 19, 1994, entitled, "Attorney, realtor wife
plead not guilty to fraud."
Specifically, the article read:
"Kent Winward faces possible disbarment if found guilty," said
Iron County Attorney Scott Burns. "The Utah Bar Council is also
conducting their own investigation into Winward's actions," he said.
As you know, I did not make any comment (either in my argument to the Court or in any
discussions with you) about Mr. Winward facing possible disbarment. Moreover, the only
comment I made with respect to the Utah Bar conducting an investigation was by way of
disclosure to the Court that I had been contacted by the Bar Council and informed that I had a
duty to provide them with certain information regarding this prosecution.
Please know that this case is difficult enough for me, as it relates to a fellow member of
the Utah Bar, and I very much resent having statements attributed to me with respect to whether
or not Mr. Winward faces disbarment. Please know that I have absolutely no idea what sanctions
(if any) Mr. Winward faces, and I do not have the sufficient background or knowledge to even
comment on that issue. Had you asked me that question, I would have simply replied, "I have
no idea whether or not Mr. Winward will face any sanctions by the Utah Bar."

~7~7

Mr. Steve Law
February 22, 1994
Page 2
1 would request, after reviewing this letter, that you contact Mr. Winwardfs attorney, Gary
Pendleton, and ask him whether or not a retraction or statement setting aside the quote attributed
to me would be desirous. If he responds in the affirmative, I would request a retraction of the
quote attributed to me and replaced by what my response would have been, "I have no idea
whether or not Mr. Winward will face any sanctions by the Utah Bar." If Mr. Pendleton believes
that a retraction would simply draw more attention to the case and my purported quote, then I
would ask that you not print a retraction.
Should you have any questions, comments, or concerns regarding this communication,
please do not hesitate to contact my offices.
Sincerely.

Scott M. Burns
Iron County Attorney
SMBxm
Attachment
pc:

Gary W. Pendleton, Esq.
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Attorney, realtor wife plead not guilty to fraud
By STEVELAW
StaFwrlter

CEDAR CITY — Cedar City
lawyer Emer Kent Winward and
his wife Kimberlee, a realtor,
pleaded not guilty to charges of
forgery and unlawful dealing of
property by feduciaiy, each a
second degree felony, during
their preliminary hearing Friday
at 5th District Court.
The Winwards will be bound
over for Jury trial that will begin
as soon as eight Jurors are
selected and the Involved parties
have had time to prepare evidence.
Kejit Winward faces possible
disbarment if found guilty, said
Iron County Attorney Scott
Burns. The Utah Bar Council is
also conducting their own investigation into Winwards actions,
he said.
The complaint against the
Winwards was first filed in
December by Nicole Packer, a
former employee of Kim's, who
alleges she discovered Kent
Winward had forged a check for
$$.697.50 from the Cedar Land
aad Title Company that was
n&de out to her. Upon Investi-

gating the case, Burns said other
questionable acts allegedly performed by the couple involving
the same issue were discovered.
On Aug. 9. 1993. Kim and
Kent Winward used Packer as
an interim signer when they purchased property from George and
Marie Bauer of Henderson. Nev.,
Burns said. The Winwards
allegedly told George Bauer they
had a buyer who had $40,000
cash. They had Packer sign the
contract as the buyer with money
received from her father. Burns
said.
Packer said she did not receive
money from her father. She said
the money came from Pat
Williams, a real estate broker
from Las Vegas, who was told
the house, was selling for
$45,000. Packer said she was
used as a go-between signer so
that the seller wouldn't know the
house was really being sold for
$45,000 and the buyer wouldn't
know it was actually sold for
$40,000.
In reward for her services,
Packer testified she was told she
would receive one-third of the
profit made from the transaction.
Packer said she was given a

check for $1,160. $160 of which
was for commission on previous
transactions. Since she received
only $1,000, she said she figured they must have made a
$3,000 profit on the Bauer to
Williams transaction.
According to Packer's testimony in Friday's preliminary
hearing, she signed documents
with no selling price listed.
Packer claimed she wasn't aware
she did anything wrong in following Kent Winward's instructions.
Packer said she found out several months later the property
was sold for $45,000 and not
$43,000. It was then. Packer
said, she realized Cedar Land
and Title Company issued her a
check for $4,697.50. Packer testified that Kim Winward
deposited the check into her own
account.
Packer said she contacted an
attorney to see if forgery charges
could be filed.
Burns said he learned the
property was sold for $58,000 at
13 percent interest to Vicki
Bassett with the Winwards serving as /purchasing agent. The
Winwards allegedly told Williams

they had a buyer who would pay
$55,000 at 13 percent interest,
and Williams agreed to the sale,
not knowing Bassett would pay
$58,000.
Bassett testified that Kent
Winward falsely told her he paid
$3,000 as a down payment.
Bassett. a hair and nail stylist,
said Winward said she could
work off the $3,000 she believed
she owed by doing hair and nails
for the Winwards*. Packer and
another girl.
All the transactions took place
Aug. 9. 1993. and the Winwards
also made six percent commission off each sale, Burns said.
Only Kent and Kim Winward
knew of all the transactions.
Burns said.
When the case goes to trial,
Burns said he will attempt to
prove theft by fiduciary (theft
through violation of a trust) and
forgery against the Winwards,
Burns said he will attempt to
prove the Winwards violated the
trust of their clients. George
Bauer and Vicki Bassett. and
that the Winwards forged
Packer's signature on a check
made out to her and deposited
it Into their oum account.

